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I. INTRODUCTION
To provide a useful perspective on corporate governance today, this 
Article examines the evolution of conceptions of “good” corporate governance 
that have successively revolutionized the corporate landscape.1  By the  
use of “evolution,” I do not mean some natural evolution, but changes in
the beliefs of managers concerning how to run their businesses effectively.2 
“Good” corporate governance refers to what is perceived as good from the 
point of view of firm managers and may or may not translate into what is 
good for society.3 
This Article shows that corporate decision making was influenced over 
the years by successive, rationalized ideals of good corporate governance.4
 1. See Neil Fligstein & Linda Markowitz, Financial Reorganization of American 
Corporations in the 1980s, in SOCIOLOGY AND THE PUBLIC AGENDA 185, 192 (William Julius 
Wilson ed., 1993) (defining conceptions as “worldviews held by managers that define
what appropriate and inappropriate responses to situations are”). 
2. The term “managers” used in this Article refers to both directors and officers of
firms. 
3. See NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL 18–20 (1990)
[hereinafter FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL].
4. Dirk M. Zorn, Here a Chief, There a Chief: The Rise of the CFO in the American 
Firm, 69 AM.SOC.REV.345, 346, 348 (2004); see Neil Fligstein, The Structural Transformation 
of American Industry: An Institutional Account of the Causes of Diversification in the 
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Changes in conceptions were precipitated by crises and environmental changes.5 
They were reasoned, if often flawed, responses to complex macroeconomic
forces, competitive conditions, regulations or the lack thereof, and other 
environmental factors.6  More importantly, they were reflections of the 
culture and thinking of the time, influenced by the views of successful business
leaders, the business press, investors, and academics.7 
Industries’ practices and practices in their own firms also influenced 
managers.8  Moreover, their backgrounds, for example in manufacturing
or finance, influenced their perceptions of the problems confronting their 
firms, the perceived causes of the problems, and how to respond to them.9 
Additionally, once structures and strategies became generally accepted,
firms were more likely to adopt them and less likely to abandon them even
if the circumstances initially causing their adoption no longer existed.10 
They would tend to persist until an economic crisis or future environmental
change would cause a reassessment.11 
While changes in conceptions of good corporate governance have occurred
over the years, there is some consistency in firm behavior.  As the power
model of corporate governance would claim, firms have acted to decrease 
the uncertainty confronting them by not only reacting to their environment 
but also by seeking to change it through their business strategies and
Largest Firms, 1919–1979, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS
311, 334–35 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991) [hereinafter Fligstein, 
The Structural Transformation of American Industry] (noting that some form of shock is
necessary but is not a sufficient condition for change). 
5. See, e.g., FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note
3, at 20; Fligstein, The Structural Transformation of American Industry, supra note 4, at 322. 
6. See Fligstein, The Structural Transformation of American Industry, supra note 
4, at 322–23; Zorn, supra note 4, at 348. 
7. FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 3, at 12. 
8. See Fligstein, The Structural Transformation of American Industry, supra note 
4, at 332; Zorn, supra note 4, at 348. 
9. See FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 3,
at 11, 18; Neil Fligstein, The Intraorganizational Power Struggle: Rise of Finance Personnel 
to Top Leadership in Large Corporations, 1919–1979, 52 AM. SOC. REV. 44, 56 (1987) 
[hereinafter Fligstein, The Intraorganizational Power Struggle]; Fligstein, The Structural 
Transformation of American Industry, supra note 4, at 322–23. 
10. Zorn, supra note 4, at 348–49 (calling this “stages-of-institutionalization thesis”); 
see Fligstein, The Structural Transformation of American Industry, supra note 4, at 311,
332–35 (discussing the role of inertia but also the possibility for change). 
11. See Zorn, supra note 4, at 348. 
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attempts to influence regulations.12  Over the years firms have sought to
increase their market share, profits, and stock prices.13  More recently, with 
the increasing power of financial markets, they have sought to increase 
their autonomy and discretion by seeking to meet the quarterly earnings
expectation of security analysts and the demands of short-term shareholders.14 
Most legal scholars take the triumph of the current shareholder value
maximization conception of good corporate governance as a given, so
entrenched that it is unlikely to change.15  That is a mistake.  As this Article
shows, conceptions of good corporate governance change over time, and 
the beliefs and circumstances that produced the current round of corporate 
governance are waning, setting the stage for far-reaching changes.  This 
Article is a comprehensive examination of the forces that produced the 
current era of corporate governance. It explains why they are unlikely to
determine the next round of corporate governance, and proposes a new 
model better suited to the era on the horizon. 
This Article utilizes a broad definition of conceptions of “corporate
governance.”  It refers to managers’ perceptions of proper corporate purposes, 
strategies, and structures.  It embraces managers’ perceptions of their
environment and their ideals regarding such matters as their firm’s interactions 
with competitors, stakeholders, and the government.  Thus, this approach 
broadens the use of the term “corporate governance” that arose during the
1980s centering on the relationship between managers and shareholders 
and focusing on managerial misconduct.16  This narrow agency-theory 
perception is reflected in the shareholder value maximization conception 
of corporate governance.17  The broader definition of corporate governance 
permits consideration of the period prior to dispersed shareholding concerns,
 12. Lynne L. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and Means, 
22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 19, 39–40 (1988) [hereinafter Dallas, Two Models of Corporate
Governance]; see Fligstein & Markowitz, supra note 1, at 192 (stating that firms have
sought to achieve “stable patterns of interactions with their largest competitors” that decreases 
the uncertainty they confront). 
13. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance, supra note 12, at 40 n.63 (discussing
Henry Mintzberg’s hierarchy of firm goals under managerialism: survival, degree of efficiency
to ensure survival, control of environment to ensure adequate degree of independence, and
growth); see infra Parts II–IV; see also FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE
CONTROL, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that the predominant firm objective is survival).
14. See infra Section IV.A.2.
 15. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate 
Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 777–78 (2006). 
16. Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate Governance Since the Managerial Capitalism 
Era, 89 BUS. HIST. REV. 717, 731 (2015) [hereinafter Cheffins, Corporate Governance]
(observing that “during the 1980s corporate governance became increasingly associated with 
shareholder returns,” with economists “recoil[ing] from the 1970s version of corporate 
governance [that] implied the corporation was a political structure to be governed”). 
17. See infra Sections III.B–C and Part IV. 
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at the turn of the nineteenth century, when the central issues were trusts
and the concentration of power in a few firms.18  The focus of discussion 
about corporate governance, as broadly defined, was then on injury to
small competitors and the public rather than shareholders.19  Moreover, 
during periods of our history, the power of autonomous, non-owner managers
was viewed by many, not mainly as a source of managerial misconduct,
but as a means to encourage managerial professionalism and the emergence
of industrial statesmen who would serve the interests of all stakeholders 
and society.20  Public shareholders were considered passive investors with 
major legislative protections of them mainly focused on their role as 
investors.21  It was only when agency theory became pervasive and institutional
investors came to control large shareholdings in public firms that corporate 
governance, as narrowly defined, came to occupy fully the corporate 
governance space with corporate purpose, strategies, and structures centered
on shareholder value maximization.22 
In earlier periods in U.S. business history, the central purpose of corporate 
governance was not to maximize stock prices, but to achieve growth, with 
survival and profit mainly as constraints.23  Managers adopted a variety of
strategies that dominated the economic landscape in different time periods 
to achieve these objectives. They included cartels, trusts, holding companies, 
vertical integration, and the unitary/functional, multidivisional, and 
conglomerate organizational forms.24  These strategies had positive as 
well as negative consequences that often caused their use to be moderated
or curtailed.25 Sometimes criticism of these strategies came from the public
and demanded governmental attention. These strategies were not inevitable 
but resulted from managerial conceptions of what was “good” corporate 
governance during the different time periods.
This is also true for the modern era in which many managers have 
adopted strategies to maximize shareholder value.  Disaggregation and 
18. See infra Section II.A.
 19. See infra Section II.A.
 20. See infra text accompanying notes 115–17. 
21. See infra text accompanying note 79. 
22. See infra Sections III.B–C; see also infra Part IV (discussing the consequences 
of shareholder value maximization). 
23. See supra note 13. See also JOHN WHITECLAY CHAMBERS II, THE TYRANNY OF
CHANGE: AMERICA IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 1890–1920, at 55 (2d ed. 1992). 
24. See infra Part II and Section III.A. 
25. See infra Part II and Sections III.A–B. 
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cost-cutting strategies have dominated this time period.26  Like prior
managerial strategies, they are not inevitable and have some negative 
consequences.  These consequences include problematic managerial 
incentives, short-termism, the unsettling empowerment of short-term investors 
and financial firms, and adverse distributional consequences, discussed in
this Article.27  As with prior eras, negative consequences are leading to
changes. For instance, I see on the horizon the emergence of the sustainability 
conception of corporate governance.28 Rather than focusing solely on 
shareholders, managers with this emerging dominant conception would 
take a broader view of their role to consider as central to their business
strategies the long-term societal value they create and the interests of
all stakeholders.29 
In Part II, I briefly examine the earlier conceptions of corporate governance 
to provide a background for understanding how corporate governance 
changes over time.  Looking at changes in the past provides hope for change 
in the future. I then examine more recent finance conceptions of corporate
governance in Part III—the portfolio and the shareholder value maximization 
conceptions. In this Part, I include my analysis of the shaky foundation
of the shareholder value maximization conception that emerged in the late 
1970s and 80s.  I argue that it was improperly grounded primarily on
claims of managerial self-interest in forming conglomerates in the 1960s
and 70s.  Finally, in Part IV I identify the adverse economic and social
consequences of the shareholder value maximization conception of corporate 
governance. Having set the stage for change in the current era due to these 
adverse consequences, I present a new model of corporate governance— 
the sustainability conception—that I believe is emerging and will be supported
by reforms that I propose.  Part V concludes.  Note that this Article focuses 
mainly on non-financial firms (hereinafter “firms”) and only touches briefly 
on labor history.
I observe that the evolving conceptions of corporate governance show 
an ongoing dynamic at work where the changes we make in the world 
change the world in which we live.  That world in turn changes our vision 
and the changes we then make, and so on.  It is this process of learning from
change that defines evolving conceptions of corporate governance as we 
look back and forward. 
26. See infra Sections III.C, IV.A.8, 10. 
27. See infra Section IV.A.
 28. See infra Section IV.B.
 29. See infra Section IV.B.
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II. EARLY CONCEPTIONS OF “GOOD” CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
This Part explores early conceptions of “good” corporate governance over 
the years through the 1960s. 
A. Cooperation Among and Acquisition of Competitors 
In the early nineteenth century, firms required a state charter to form and 
were formed mainly for public purposes.30  Firms were considered artificial
entities with powers conferred on them by the state through chartering.31 
As opposition grew to special privileges granted by legislatures through 
chartering, states in the mid-1800s began adopting general incorporation 
statutes that permitted persons to form firms by merely filing articles of 
incorporation with the state.32  However, responding to a general fear of
the growing economic power of some firms, states initially imposed limits 
on firms, such as on their size and duration, and prohibited them from 
owning stock in other firms.33  These limitations diminished as the century 
progressed.34  This led to new ideas about the theory of the firm, away from 
the artificial entity view of the firm to private views of the firm as a contract- 
partnership among owners or as natural/real entities.35  It is believed that
 30. JONATHAN LEVY, FREAKS OF FORTUNE: THE EMERGING WORLD OF CAPITALISM
AND RISK IN AMERICA 275 (2012); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J.
201, 207 [hereinafter Millon, Theories of the Corporation]; cf. Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth 
Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1673, 1682–83, 1695 (2015). 
31. Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 
88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 181 (1986) (referring to this view as the grant or concession theory of
the firm); Millon, Theories of the Corporation, supra note 30, at 206. 
32. See LEVY, supra note 30, at 275 n.23; Horwitz, supra note 31, at 181; Millon, 
Theories of the Corporation, supra note 30, at 207–08. 
33. Millon, Theories of the Corporation, supra note 30, at 208–10. 
34. Id. at 211–12. 
35. Horwitz, supra note 31, at 181–82; Millon, Theories of the Corporation, supra
note 30, at 202–03, 213–16; see 1 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 515, at 482 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 2d ed. 1886) (reflecting the
contractual-partnership view of the firm); Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the 
Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1458–64, 1471–73 (1987)
(discussing the courts’ gradual adoption of a partnership vision of the corporation—proposed 
by corporate attorneys—that viewed corporate property as the individual shareholders’ 
property and the natural or real person/entity view); cf. Eric W. Orts, Theorizing the Firm: 
Organizational Ontology in the Supreme Court, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 559, 564 (2016) 
(rejecting the necessity of choosing under institutional theory between an artificial entity
and aggregate view of the firm). 
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the natural/real entity view that came to the fore legitimized the emergence 
of big businesses in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century.36 
The dominant conception of good corporate governance for firms in the 
late nineteenth century was to seek survival and growth, mainly through 
cooperating with or acquiring competitors.37 This period was characterized
by the significant growth of firms and beginning in the 1890s, many large 
industrial firms, encouraged by investment bankers, began listing their
securities on the Stock Exchange.38 
During 1870–1895 intense price competition and overproduction 
contributed to recurring financial panics and recessions.39  Many managers— 
usually the founders—of firms requiring large capital investments believed
that intensive competition and such major contractions threatened the 
survival of their industries.40  The initial strategies adopted by firms were
cartel and pooling agreements and then trusts.41 Many industrial and financial 
leaders, some economists, and others at the time justified industrial concentration
as inevitable, desirable, and “necessary to compete effectively against
European cartels in the international market.”42  They contended that trusts
were the outcome of a historical process of development from the individual
to the partnership to the corporation to the trust.43  However, there was
considerable public opposition to these new concentrations of economic
 36. See LEVY, supra note 30, at 275; Horwitz, supra note 31, at 175–76, 185–90,
200–02 (explaining that the natural entity view supported firm growth with limited liability
for shareholders, the abandonment of shareholder unanimity, and the demise of the ultra
vires doctrine); Mark, supra note 35, at 1480–82; Millon, Theories of the Corporation,
supra note 30, at 216 (“The existence as well as the size of the business corporations were
considered natural phenomena. As such, there no longer appeared to be any justification
for legal regulation peculiar to corporate (as opposed to individual) activity, and the state’s 
traditional regulatory responsibility was deemphasized.”). 
37. See FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 3, at 
12–13, 33–37. 
38. See id. at 23–24, 38–39. 
39. Id. at 37–38; LEVY, supra note 30, at 276; List of Recessions in the United States, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_recessions_in_the_United_States [https://perma. 
cc/GWQ2-X67D].
40. See CHAMBERS II, supra note 23, at 56; FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 3, at 37–38. 
41. See FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 3, 
at 38–42, 57–58; Horwitz, supra note 31, at 190; Barak Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling,
The Antitrust Curse of Bigness, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 606–08 (2012). 
42. CHAMBERS II, supra note 23, at 60; see Horwitz, supra note 31, at 190–94. 
43. Horwitz, supra note 31, at 194; see also LEVY, supra note 30, at 267, 290–91 
(noting that a prominent financial leader of the time, George Walbridge Perkins, Sr., viewed
the trusts as representing a beneficial public development from individualistic competition
to cooperative risk management).
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power and cartels and trusts soon faced significant political and legal
challenges that led firms to form holding companies.44 
To assist firms, New Jersey in 1888 amended its corporation statute 
permitting firms to own shares in other firms.45  Other states soon followed
suit and enabled firms to form holding companies.46  When some of the
largest new industrial combinations continued to make profits by limiting 
the decline of prices in their industries during the depression that began in 
1893, emulators consolidated other industries when prosperity returned.47 
The first great merger wave ensued between 1897 and 1903, fostered by weak
enforcement of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, with such consolidated
firms as General Electric, International Harvester, DuPont, Eastman Kodak, 
U.S. Steel and Standard Oil coming to dominate their industries.48  The mergers 
consisted primarily of horizontal mergers of single-product firms with high 
levels of capital investments and low profits.49  The strategy of choice for 
the mergers was the holding company structure.50  The objective was to 
increase market share controlled by a single firm, concentrate production 
in plants operating at full capacity, and stabilize prices.51 
Firms during this period sought to control and manage their environment
in order to prosper and survive.52  They were successful in doing so, with 
44. See CHAMBERS II, supra note 23, at 194–95.  Cartels also often failed for their 
inability to prevent defection.  See FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL, 
supra note 3, at 23, 57–58, 66; William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A
Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2000, at 43, 44–45. 
45. Millon, Theories of the Corporation, supra note 30, at 212 (citing Act of Apr.
4, 1888, ch. 269, 1888 N.J. Laws 385; Act of Apr. 7, 1888, ch. 295, 1888 N.J. Laws 445). 
46. Id.  Additionally, majority shareholder voting on mergers and other fundamental
changes came to replace the unanimity requirement for such changes.  Lynne L. Dallas, The
Control and Conflict of Interest Voting Systems, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1, 10 (1992) [hereinafter
Dallas, Voting Systems]; Millon, Theories of the Corporation, supra note 30, at 215. 
47. CHAMBERS II, supra note 23, at 55. 
48. Id.  The dates used for the depression and ensuing merger wave vary among sources. 
E.g., LEVY, supra note 30, at 274 (referring to the 1890s depression and “the Great Merger 
Movement of 1895 to 1904”).
49. FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 3, at 64– 
66, 72.
 50. See id. at 57–60, 64, 66–67, 70–74 (discussing the problems with trusts and the 
advantages of mergers with  the holding company becoming the surviving firm in mergers 
of previously competing firms); LEVY, supra note 30, at 276–77 (noting that New Jersey, 
by permitting holding companies, became the “legal home to the Great Merger Movement”). 
51. See FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 3,
at 57–60, 64. 
52. See id. at 57–60, 64, 76. 
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large portions of industries being controlled by trusts and holding companies. 
For example, at its peak the Standard Oil Trust, formed in 1882, controlled
90% of the oil industry.53  These monopolization efforts were effective 
from the point of view of the firms and arguably society.54  But they drew
public criticism for allegedly corrupting lawmakers, destroying opportunities 
for smaller competitive businesses, and wrecking a competitive market
system with their administered prices.55  Cartels, trusts, and holding companies
were challenged under state and federal antitrust laws.56  In the Reformist 
Progressive Era, oligopoly replaced monopoly, as a handful of large firms 
rather than a single giant corporation came to dominate several major
industries.57  The entrepreneurial founders of firms, such as John D. Rockefeller
of Standard Oil and other monopolists of his ilk, came to be criticized by
many historians as “robber barons” or unscrupulous, freewheeling buccaneers,
while some others continued to uphold them and their memory as innovative 
“captains of industry.”58 
B. Manufacturing and the Unitary, Functional Form of Organization
By the end of the nineteenth century, firms were reaching out to public 
shareholders for capital by listing their shares on the Stock Exchange. 
Corporate power gradually shifted from the shareholders to managers.59  In
addition, professional managers began to replace founding entrepreneurs.60 
The contract-partnership theory of the firm became less reflective of reality 
than the natural/real entity theory given firms’ functional economic autonomy
53. Id. at 48.  Another example is International Paper Inc., a holding company that 
controlled 75% of the U.S. paper market.  Id. at 63–64.  It subsequently closed less efficient 
plants in favor of operating larger, newer plants.  See id. at 76. 
54. Although they were not able to attain above average pricing because of competition 
from existing competitors and new entrants, they were able to stabilize prices. Id. at 106– 
08.  Jonathan Levy quotes John D. Rockefeller, who stated, “[W]e were all in a sinking
ship, if existing cutthroat competition continued . . . .  The Standard Oil Company was an
angel of mercy . . . .” LEVY, supra note 30, at 264. 
55. See CHAMBERS II, supra note 23, at 58–60 (noting that they were also criticized 
for monopolizing credit and stimulating inflation); Orbach & Rebling, supra note 41, at 
606, 608. 
56. See FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 3, at
66–67, 70–74, 96–98, 106–08; Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 44, at 45.  Trusts were also
challenged under state law. 
57. For example, U.S. Steel’s market dropped from 62% in 1901 to 40% in 1920. 
Standard Oil’s share of refined petroleum, among its successor regional Standard Oil companies,
dropped from 90% in 1899 to 50% in 1920. CHAMBERS II, supra note 23, at 57. 
58.  Orbach & Rebling, supra note 41, at 606. 
59. Dallas, Voting Systems, supra note 46, at 9–10; see Millon, Theories of the 
Corporation, supra note 30, at 215–16. 
60. See CHAMBERS II, supra note 23, at 56 (discussing the “rise of substantial corporate 
bureaucracies” to deal with the new “supercorporations”). 
500
DALLAS (DO NOT DELETE) 8/15/2018 9:51 AM     
 
    
 
   
 



















   
   
  







[VOL. 54:  491, 2017] Is There Hope for Change? 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
that was in the hands of managers rather than incorporators or shareholders.61 
Directors were no longer considered agents of the shareholders.62  Courts
viewed directors’ powers as neither conferred nor revocable by the 
shareholders.63  Firms were viewed as having their own personality.64 
They were “autonomous, self-sufficient and renewing bod[ies],” private, and 
separated from the state and from their shareholders who were seen as mere 
investors.65 
In the early twentieth century the dominant conception of corporate 
governance was to seek survival and growth by integrating and protecting 
the manufacturing operations of the firm.66  Professional managers with 
manufacturing backgrounds became the largest group of presidents.67  Many
firms formed by mergers during the great consolidation, 1897 to 1903,
were no longer in existence, indicating inefficiencies with their structure
and competition from existing competitors and new entrants.68  Thus, to
better manage their firms, managers moved from the holding company
structure to the unitary, functional form of corporate governance that
integrated the firm’s activities into separate departments that specialized in 
specific functions, such as purchasing, manufacturing, and distribution.69 
Managers also increasingly sought to protect their manufacturing operations 
through vertical integration.70  Vertical integration enabled firms to control
the functions relevant to the production and distribution of their products 
and protected the large investments required in plants.71  It was also used 
as a defensive strategy due to the fear that competitors would vertically
 61. See Mark, supra note 35, at 1465, 1472, 1479–80; Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 
supra note 30, at 213–16. 
62. Horwitz, supra note 31, at 183. 
63. See Dallas, Voting Systems, supra note 46, at 9–10; Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 
supra note 30, at 215; see, e.g., People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 94 N.E. 634, 637 (N.Y.
1911).
64. See Millon, Theories of the Corporation, supra note 30, at 215–26. 
65. Thomas P. Byrne, False Profits: Reviving the Corporation’s Public Purpose, 
57 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 25, 34 (2010). 
66. FLIGSTEIN,THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 3, at 13–14. 
67. Fligstein, The Intraorganizational Power Struggle, supra note 9, at 47 & tbl.2 
(noting that in the 100 largest firms from 1919–1939, manufacturing presidents increased
from 23% to 34%, and entrepreneurs declined from 28% to 18%).  Functional backgrounds 
are determined on the basis of previous job titles, not by education. Id. at 51. 
68. FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 3, at 
24. 
69. Id. at 109–10. 
70. Id. at 14, 75. 
71. Id.
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integrate and interfere with the firm’s ability to obtain raw materials and
machinery—particularly in times of shortage—and transport its products.72 
It was also used offensively to exert control over competitors.73 Henry Ford,
for example, acquired railroads, coal mines, timberland, freighter ships, and 
glass work plants in an attempt to control all aspects of the Model T’s
production.74 
The merger movement in the period 1926 to 1930 contributed to the 
strengthening and creation of oligopolies in many industries due to horizontal 
and vertical integration.75  Despite the passage of the Clayton Act of 1914,
antitrust was quite lax for twenty years after its passage.76  Therefore, firms’
merger strategies were rational responses by individual managers to the
environment of the time.  One study found that the level of industry concentration
and integration was related to the likelihood of firm survival.77  Moreover,
the growth in sales, assets, and profits for the 100 largest firms from 1919– 
1929 was higher for vertically integrated firms than for other firms.78 
C. Marketing and Sales and the Multidivisional Form of Organization 
The Great Depression created a national crisis that caused rethinking of 
the way firms were regulated.  A major regulatory development was the 
passage of the federal securities laws, most notably the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which were intended to 
protect shareholders as investors, mainly through disclosure regulations.79 
The famous debate between Professors Adolf A. Berle and E. Merrick Dodd,
Jr. that occurred during this period focused on the separation of ownership
from control in large corporations, concern over the accountability of non­
72. Id.
 73. Id.
 74. Frank Goad, Ford Motor Company – 100 Years of Advanced Manufacturing in
Kentucky, LANE REP. (July 17, 2013), http://www.lanereport.com/22644/2013/07/ford­
motor-co-100-years-of-advanced-manufacturing-in-kentucky/ [https://perma.cc/WK49-JE33].
Henry Ford is also known for developing the automobile assembly line, which required
the integration of thousands of parts. CHAMBERS II, supra note 23, at 62. 
75. See FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 3,
at 115; see also CHAMBERS II, supra note 23, at 57 (“Oligopoly, in which a handful of
large firms dominated the market, characterized American industry . . . .”).
76. Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 44, at 46.
 77. FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 3, at 108–09. 
78. Id. at 111. 
79. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. § 78(a); see Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A 
Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 329–30 (1988). 
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owner managers, and the power present in a small number of large firms.80 
Berle and Dodd agreed that governmental regulation was justified in 
regulating firms to assure societal benefits.81 However, Professor Berle
viewed the firm as an aggregation of persons and opined at that time that
it should operate in the sole interests of the shareholders82 until a “clear 
and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone else” 
could be devised.83 Professor Dodd, essentially relying on the natural entity
theory, believed at that time that directors owed fiduciary duties not to the 
shareholders but to the firm, giving corporate statesmen leeway to serve 
not only the shareholders but other stakeholders as well.84 
The Great Depression also caused a reconsideration of antitrust policy. 
Initially, the severity of the Great Depression was blamed in part on excessive
competition driving prices below costs.85  Consequently, cooperation among 
competitors was viewed favorably as curbing “the wasteful features of
competition.”86  For various reasons, antitrust enforcement from 1915 to 1936 
was tolerant of collusion and information sharing among competitors, and
 80. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 300–01 (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. rev. ed. 1968); Millon, Theories
of the Corporation, supra note 30, at 217–18; cf. MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK 
OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE passim (1994)
(explaining that this separation of control from ownership was not inevitable but was the 
result of politics); C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An
Historical Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 93–96 (2002)
[hereinafter Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility] (discussing Berle and
Dodd’s concern with corporate power in a small number of firms). 
81. BERLE&MEANS, supra note 80, at 312; Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 
supra note 12, at 20 n.5. 
82. Millon, Theories of the Corporation, supra note 30, at 222–23 (explaining that 
“Berle and Means effectively disregarded notions of the corporate entity” and that the
“theory of the corporation implicit in their work is of an aggregation composed of shareholders 
and management”). 
 83. Adolf Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 1365, 1367 (1932). 
84. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 1145, 1161 (1932); Millon, Theories of the Corporation, supra note 30, at 217– 
18; see Rick Wartzman, Whatever Happened to Corporate Stewardship?, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Aug. 29, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/08/whatever-happened-to-corporate-stewardship 
[https://perma.cc/WS65-UVRK].  Berle and Means later modified their positions to come
closer to the other’s position. See Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility, 
supra note 80, at 96–98, 101–03. 
85.  Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 44, at 46–47. 
86. Id. at 46.  This was considered an “associational view” of the proper relationship
between business and government. Id.
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dominant firm behavior was, in general, treated leniently.87  However,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt abandoned this approach in the mid-1930s.88 
A number of lawsuits were brought against dominant firms for collusive 
and anticompetitive behavior, an approach supported by University of Chicago 
economists at the time.89  A period of active antitrust enforcement ensued 
from the mid-1930s until the early 1970s, except during World War II.  In 
1950 a majority of the hundred largest U.S. firms were defendants in antitrust
lawsuits.90 Courts found per se illegal both price fixing agreements among 
competitors and tying arrangements used by firms to further their sales of 
related products.91  In 1950, Congress passed the Celler–Kefauver Act that
controlled the acquisition of market share through horizontal and vertical
transactions.92  Small foreclosures of competition in submarkets through 
mergers were found illegal under the Act.93 
Although firms in the 1920s had begun to focus on sales and marketing,
this firm strategy accelerated after the Great Depression when firms observed 
that firms that had expanded into related products were more successful
in surviving the Depression.94  Countercyclical product offerings provided
some revenue stability and opportunities for firm growth, and related product
offerings allowed firms to achieve economies of scale in production and
product distribution.95 Moreover, active antitrust enforcement after the
Depression that challenged horizontal and vertical integration propelled 
firms to seek to grow by developing related product lines.96 
Unlike previous periods, firms avoided direct competition with competitors 
by engaging in product differentiation that appealed to different consumer
market segments—in terms of quality, style, and price—and by expanding
 87. Id. at 47–48. 
88. Id. at 49. 
89. See id. at 49–51. 
90. Fligstein, The Structural Transformation of American Industry, supra note 4, at 321. 
91. E.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 1–2 (1958) (finding agreements 
that condition or tie the sale of one product with the purchase of another illegal per se);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 150 (1940) (condemning as illegal
per se arrangements among competitors to fix prices); see Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note
44, at 50. 
92.  The Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1996). 
93. E.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 547–48 (1966); Brown 
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 294 (1962); see Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 44, at
51. 
94. FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 3, at 119,
138–39. The Progressive Era saw the development of the mass marketing of products through 
advertisements, dealerships, service stations, and chain stores.  See CHAMBERS II, supra note 
23, at 63. 
95. See FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 3, at 
124–25, 228–31. 
96. See Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 44, at 49–52. 
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into new geographical markets, including global markets.97  Firms focused 
on expansion rather than predatory competition.98 
Product diversification, although spreading unevenly among industries, 
continued into the post-WWII years.99  To facilitate the expansion into related 
products, many firms replaced the unitary, functional form of corporate 
governance with the multidivisional form.100  Firms allocated to division 
managers the responsibility for most of the functions associated with producing 
and distributing specified products.101  Management was largely decentralized 
with the central office retaining only limited functions, such as in finance 
and new product research.102  As for vertical integration, the Depression 
demonstrated the vulnerability of vertically integrated firms during business 
downturns because of the substantial investments necessary to integrate.103 
However, vertical integration increased in the years following 1919 but 
began to decline in 1959.104 
Advertising by firms increased during this period,105 as did the percentage 
of presidents with sales and marketing backgrounds in large firms.106 
However, during the period 1939 to 1959, manufacturing presidents were 
97. FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 3, at 123,
145 tbl.4.1, 232 (showing that the percentage of the 100 largest firms selling in global markets 
increased from 20% in 1919–1929, to 62% in 1948–1959, to 88% by 1969–1979). 
98. Id. at 14. 
99. Id. at 145 tbl.4.1. The percentage of the 100 largest firms with related product 
diversification increased from 13% in 1919–1929, to 34% in 1948–1959, and to 54%
by 1959–1969.  Id.
100. See id. at 233–38.  The multidivisional form was used as early as the 1920s 
to accommodate diverse product lines.  However, its use by the 100 largest firms increased 
from 8% in 1939 to 73% in 1969, with the greatest percentage change occurring from 
1948–1959. Fligstein, The Intraorganizational Power Struggle, supra note 9, at 53.
 101. FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 3, at 17. 
102. Id.; Fligstein, The Intraorganizational Power Struggle, supra note 9, at 48. 
103. See FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 3, 
at 117. 
104. Id. at 145–46, 145 tbl.4.1.
105. Advertising increased from $500 million to $1.5 billion from 1921–1927, and
from $3.2 billion to $10 billion from 1946–1956.  Id. at 124, 232.  An estimated $50 million 
was spent on market research, up from $10 million before WWII. Id. at 231. Firms often
set up research and development departments to explore new products and marketing research
departments. Id. at 231–32. Market research directors at many firms attended high-level 
policy meetings.  Id.
 106. Fligstein, The Intraorganizational Power Struggle, supra note 9, at 47 & tbl.2 (finding
that in the 100 largest firms from 1939–1959, sales presidents increased from 14% to 22%, 
finance presidents increased from 6% to 16%, and manufacturing presidents declined from
34% to 26%).
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more likely to head single product firms with the unitary, functional form, 
whereas marketing and sales presidents were more likely to head 
multidivisional firms with related product strategies.107  Moreover, firms 
were more likely to switch to related product diversification if they had
marketing and sales presidents and if they saw new firms successfully 
using this strategy.108  Firms navigated their environment to increase their 
opportunities to grow by increasing their sales in related products.109 
This focus on growth was consistent with the objectives of firm managers
during this period who identified with their firms and relied on them for 
career mobility and security.110  Firm growth provided opportunities for
bureaucratic advancement and many employees spent their work lives at
the same firm as they worked their way up the firm job ladder.111  CEOs
viewed themselves as stewards of their firms, concerned with its survival
and long-term wellbeing.112  In the three decades following World War II 
into the 1970s, this view, referred to by some as “managerialism,” prevailed.113 
Firm managers considered themselves “organization” men loyal to their firms
and as part of a team devoted to the work performed by their firms.114  As 
107. Id. at 55. 
108. See FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 3,
at 158–60. 
109. See Fligstein, The Intraorganizational Power Struggle, supra note 9, at 49. 
110. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 156–66 (2d ed., rev.
1971) (explaining that managers identified with the long-term wellbeing of their firm 
because of their long tenure with it as they climbed up the corporate ladder); June Carbone 
& Nancy Levit, The Death of the Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. 963, 980 (2017) (noting that 
managers under managerialism viewed their “success and well-being far more with the 
health and prestige of their companies than with their individual bank accounts,” and how 
“employment became a foundation for individual security” as firms had greater “firm
investment in workers and a correspondingly greater commitment to worker tenure”). 
111. William K. Black & June Carbone, Economic Ideology and the Rise of the Firm 
as a Criminal Enterprise, 49 AKRON L. REV. 371, 383–84, 386–87 (2016); see also Rosemary
L. Batt & Eileen Appelbaum, The Impact of Financialization on Management and Employment
Outcomes 7–8 (W.E. Upjohn Inst. for Emp’t Research, Working Paper No. 13-191, 2013)
(explaining how a long-term perspective served the interests of managers as well as others).
112. E.g., Black & Carbone, supra note 111, at 385–88 (noting that CEOs viewed
themselves as stewards of their firms concerned with its long-term wellbeing); Carbone & 
Levit, supra note 110, at 990 (“[C]orporate managers embraced the corporate brand and
saw their role as one of stewardship of the institution.”). 
113. E.g., Rakesh Khurana, The Curse of the Superstar CEO, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Sept. 2002, at 60, 62. 
114. Black & Carbone, supra note 111, at 383–84 (citing Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise 
of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of Managerialism (in the Closet), 
36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169, 1171 (2013)); Carbone & Levit, supra note 110, at 978–79 
(discussing the importance of group decision making in the managerial firm, which led to
a high expectation of personal honesty and benefits resulting from being part of a group rather
than competing for individual bonuses and perks); Cheffins, Corporate Governance, supra
note 16, at 723. 
506
DALLAS (DO NOT DELETE) 8/15/2018 9:51 AM     
 
























         
   









[VOL. 54:  491, 2017] Is There Hope for Change? 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
industrial statesmen, they accommodated a wide range of constituencies,
including shareholders, employees, consumers, and suppliers.115  In what
was referred to as “capitalism with a conscience” or “enlightened conservatism,”
managers during this period came to judge their decisions not only based
on profitability but also on their impact on society.116  Exemplifying this
approach was the statement of the president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
in 1956: “Business today views its own work through the eyes of the 
community and looks to the total welfare in terms of the long pull.”117 
Many executives participated in community projects, and their firms
encouraged them to become civic leaders.118 
Throughout U.S. history there were public debates about the purposes 
and methods of corporations, particularly when power became concentrated
in a few firms in various industries.119  These debates occurred regardless 
of the particulars of share ownership.120 However, when passive, public
shareholders acquired shares in major firms, theoretical debates arose
concerning the consequences of the separation of property from control 
of the corporation as exhibited by the Berle-Dodd debates discussed
previously.121 Did this provide a theoretical basis for requiring firms to 
operate in the public interest or was governmental intervention necessary
to assure managerial accountability to shareholders?122  Initially, a system
of managerialism arose in which control of the firm was for most practical
purposes in the hands of professional managers.123  This system had some 
advantages, particularly in the 1950s and 60s when many managers viewed
themselves as stewards of their firms and as accommodating the interests
 115. Wartzman, supra note 84; see Black & Carbone, supra note 111, at 394–95; 
Cheffins, Corporate Governance, supra note 16, at 730; Sanford M. Jacoby, Employee
Representation and Corporate Governance: A Missing Link, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.
449, 454–55 (2001) (referring to this ethos as “welfare capitalism”).  There is evidence that 
these views were also held in the beginning of the 1980s.  Ralph Gomory & Richard Sylla, 
The American Corporation, DAEDALUS, Spring 2013, at 102, 107 (discussing the views of
the Business Roundtable in 1981). 
116. E.g., The New Conservatism, TIME, Nov. 26, 1956, at 98, 98. 
117. Id.
 118. Time and Talent Means More Than Money, TIME, Sept. 24, 1956, at 86, 86
(explaining how some top executives spend up to one-third of their time on community projects). 
119. Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 80, at 77–79, 
99–101. 
120. See id. at 98–100. 
121. See id. at 87–96. 
122. See id. at 98–99. 
123. Id. at 84. 
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of various stakeholders. It should be noted that various sources of 
countervailing power existed to managerial power during this period that
facilitated a stakeholder approach, such as from governmental regulations 
and labor.124  Managerialism persisted until later challenged by the shareholder
value maximization conception of corporate governance that emerged in
the late 1970s and became generally accepted in the 1980s and 90s and 
thereafter.
III. MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF “GOOD” CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
This Part is devoted to the modern finance conceptions of corporate 
governance. In Part III.A I discuss the portfolio conception of corporate 
governance and the conglomerate form of organization.  In Part III.B I 
explore the origins of the shareholder value maximization conception and 
provide a retrospective analysis of conglomerates.  I discuss in Part III.C 
the emergence of the shareholder value maximization conception and 
disaggregation strategies. 
A. The Portfolio Conception and Conglomerates 
The portfolio conception of “good” corporate governance prevailed in 
the 1960s and 70s.  It viewed the firm as a “bundle of assets,” each evaluated 
on the basis of its risk profile and rate of return, and embraced conglomeration.125 
This finance conception was supported by modern accounting systems,
portfolio theory, and simplified the evaluation of firms’ operations that 
were embodied by that time in the multidivisional form of organization.126 
The portfolio conception of the firm and the multidivisional form supported
the belief that firms should expand beyond producing related products into
 124. See CHAMBERS II, supra note 23, at 67–68, 70–74; Wells, The Cycles of Corporate 
Social Responsibility, supra note 80, at 99. 
125. Fligstein & Markowitz, supra note 1, at 192; Gerald F. Davis et al., The Decline 
and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm in the 1980s: The Deinstitutionalization of an
Organizational Form, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 547, 547 (1994) [hereinafter Davis et al., The 
Decline and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm] (referring to the “firm-as-portfolio” model). 
The view of the firm as a bundle of assets is also associated with managers’ finance view 
of their firms in later eras although it was not, as it was in the 1960s and 70s, associated 
with conglomeration. See Fligstein & Markowitz, supra note 1, at 187; William Ocasio
& Hyosun Kim, The Circulation of Corporate Control: Selection of Functional Backgrounds
of New CEOs in Large Manufacturing Firms, 1981–1992, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 532, 532 
(1999); Özgür Orhangazi, Financialisation and Capital Accumulation in the Non-Financial
Corporate Sector: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation on the US Economy: 1973–
2003, 32 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 863, 868 (2008). 
126. See FLIGSTEIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 3, 
at 14, 75; Davis et al., The Decline and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm, supra note 125, at 553. 
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the production of unrelated products.127  In this way firms could diversify 
their portfolios of investments and attain the advantages of portfolio
diversification. The main tools of the finance conception of corporate 
governance were mergers, divestitures, stock repurchases and the rebalancing 
of debt and equity.128 
The view of the firm as a portfolio of assets was exemplified by the
merger wave of the 1960s and early 1970.  During this period many large
firms became conglomerates as a way to expand and diversify their portfolios.129 
The growth of firms into unrelated products was also particularly attractive 
because of the risks during this period of antitrust challenges for firms that
grew horizontally or vertically.130 
The portfolio conception was also associated with the increase in 
finance presidents in the 1960s and 70s.131  In the 100 largest U.S. firms 
during the period 1959 to 1979 the percentage of finance presidents increased 
from 16.1% to 27.5%.132  Finance presidents were inclined as a result of 
their training to view the operations of their firms mainly in financial
terms.  Chief financial officers (CFO) also began to enter the executive
suite during this period.  The rise of the CFO, often second to the CEO, 
indicated “a fundamental shift in power, visibility, and strategic importance 
of the finance function.”133  A number of factors made the expertise of a
CFO especially important.  For instance, CFOs were in demand to navigate
the FASB accounting rules adopted in 1979 that required the disclosure 
of asset replacement cost information that would have an effect on firm 
127. See Davis et al., The Decline and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm, supra note 125, at
547. 
128.  Batt & Appelbaum, supra note 111, at 3; Fligstein & Markowitz, supra note 1, 
at 192–93. 
129. Fligstein, The Structural Transformation of American Industry, supra note 4, at 
311, 321. 
130. Timothy M. Hurley, The Urge to Merge: Contemporary Theories on the Rise 
of Conglomerate Mergers in the 1960s, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 185, 195–97 (2006); Kovacic 
& Shapiro, supra note 44, at 51. 
131. See Batt & Applebaum, supra note 111, at 6 (viewing the decline of managerial 
capitalism in favor of finance capitalism as beginning in the 1950s).
132. Fligstein, The Intraorganizational Power Struggle, supra note 9, at 47 tbl.2.  In 
the 100 largest U.S. firms during the period 1959–1979, generalist presidents increased from 
10.4% to 15.8% and lawyers declined from 9.6% to 6.7%. Id.
 133. Zorn, supra note 4, at 347, 353.  Regarding the enhanced importance of the CFO’s 
role, see id. at 347, 352, 361. 
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d a CFO in 1966.135  This practice 
B. 	The Origins of the Shareholder Value Maximization Conception 
and a Retrospective Analysis of Conglomerates 
Economists in the late 1970s provided the theoretical underpinning for 
a shareholder value maximization conception.  Unlike managerialism, this 
conception meant the firm’s purpose was to maximize shareholder value.
It is based on the “nexus of contract” theory of the firm.137  This theory is
a disaggregation view of the firm, that is, the firm is a nexus or a mere
connection among private, contracting parties rather than an entity. It 
serves as a marketplace in which goods and services are exchanged. The 
firm is analogized to a spot market, like a wheat or stock market.138  Thus,
this theory rejects the view that the firm is a political or social actor.  As 
Michael Jensen and William Meckling stated in their influential 1976 article: 
“We seldom fall into the trap of characterizing the wheat or stock market
as an individual, but we often make this error by thinking about organizations
as if they were persons with motivations and intentions.”139  Thus, with
this theory, it makes no sense to view the firm as a social institution or as 
a person with social responsibility.140  It is merely a financial construct
with the goal of efficiency being achieved by the maximization of shareholder
value.141  This perspective came to be called “agency theory” with managers
viewed as the agents of shareholders.142
 134. Id. at 351.  Due to high inflation, many major firms had asset values lower than
their stock market values.  CFOs came to the fore with their abilities to find ways to leverage 
capital, evaluate acquisitions and divestitures, and fend off hostile takeovers. Id. at 361 & 
n.9. 
135. Id. at 354, 356. 
136. See id. at 346 (finding that by the year 2000, 80% of the 400 largest firms had 
CFOs).
137. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 788 (1972); Michael C. Jensen & William
H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 
3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976). 
138.  Jensen & Meckling, supra note 137, at 311. 
139. Id.
 140. Id. 
141. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s 
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1191 (1981) (“So
long as it continues to be lawful to form corporations for profit, shareholders are entitled 
to hire managers dedicated to the shareholders’ interest alone.  The duty of management is to
operate efficiently and thus maximize the return to shareholders.”).
142. Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and 
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1986); William Lazonick & Mary O’Sullivan, 
Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology for Corporate Governance, 29 ECON. & 
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As was the case throughout U.S. firm history, there were public pressures
against a private view of the firm.  For example, in the 1970s social activism
arose when shareholder activists submitted proposals on social issues at
annual shareholder meetings.143  This was exemplified by a shareholder 
proposal to stop the Dow Chemical Company from producing napalm for 
use in the Vietnam War, a move that garnered a lot of publicity.144  There 
were also calls for public-interest board directors, notably by Ralph Nader
who orchestrated a campaign to add public interest directors to GM’s
board.145  However, armed with the new theoretical approach, shareholder 
activism in future years focused more on shareholder economic interests146 
and led to changes that enhanced shareholder power.147 
The new agency theory focusing on shareholders also became popular 
because of the academic prestige of its proponents and their efforts to widely
disseminate their views to the business community and business school
students.148  It also provided an easily understood explanation for problems
facing businesses in the 1970s as they confronted the decline in their
competitiveness with foreign firms and decreases in their stock prices.  A 
major cause of these problems, according to agency theory, was the conflict
of interest between managers and shareholders, that is, managers did not
SOC’Y 13, 15–16 (2000); Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is To Increase
Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at 33. 
143. Lyman Johnson, Law and the History of Corporate Responsibility: Corporate 
Governance, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 974, 982 (2013).  Public concerns over mismanagement
by managers have pervaded U.S. corporate history.  In the 1970s, the failure of Penn 
Central and foreign bribery scandals received considerable public attention for destroying
shareholder value.  Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 80, 
at 120. 
144. Johnson, supra note 143, at 982–83. 
145. Id. at 979, 983. 
146. Cheffins, Corporate Governance, supra note 16, at 731–32.  “This trend did not 
yield radical changes” initially, but did over time. Id. at 732. 
147. These changes include the decline in staggered boards, the increase in majority
voting for directors, changes that decrease the cost of proxy solicitations, the reduction in
the scope of broker discretionary authority, developments in proxy access, and the failure 
to broaden in the context of hedge fund activism the definition of “group” for purposes of
beneficial-ownership disclosures.  John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door:
The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 562– 
70 (2016); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1007– 
22 (2010).
148. RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS: THE SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF
MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION 318–19, 321–23 (2007). 
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maximize shareholder value.149  In the 1960s and 70s, agency theorists
claimed that managers used cash flow to fund negative-net-present-value 
investments to diversify and grow their firms and failed to exit excess 
capacity industries.150  They purportedly acted in their self-interest rather 
than the interests of the shareholders by creating conglomerates.  They
were viewed as having been motivated by a desire to extend their control 
and increase their compensation that was based on firm size.151 
This theory provided a simple answer to the crises of the time—managerial 
self-interest—and, perhaps not coincidentally, an answer that would serve
the interests of financial firms who had become substantial shareholders 
in U.S. firms.152  The solution, according to agency theory, was for firms 
to maximize shareholder value and adopt means to assure managerial 
accountability in the future.153  Agency theorists viewed hostile takeovers
and large debt levels as positive ways to discipline managers.154  They also
encouraged boards of directors to align managerial compensation with the 
interests of shareholders and to make payouts to shareholders through
dividends and stock buybacks, thus requiring managers to justify their 
investments by returning to the stock market for capital.155 
The shareholder value maximization conception supported the merger 
wave of the 1980s, the largest merger wave to that point in U.S. history.156 
Over 29% of 1980 Fortune 500 companies received takeover offers during 
this period, most of which were hostile.157  This wave consisted of transactions
that busted up many conglomerates.158 It was notable for the use by firms
149. Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Winter 1988, at 21, 28 [hereinafter Jensen, Takeovers].
150. Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger
Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 
2001, at 121, 129; Jensen, Takeovers, supra note 149, at 28 (noting that this cash flow was 
referred to as “free cash flow”).
151. Frank Dobbin & Dirk Zorn, Corporate Malfeasance and the Myth of Shareholder 
Value, in 17 POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY 179, 183 (Diane E. Davis ed., 2005); 
Jensen, Takeovers, supra note 149, at 28–29. 
152. See infra text accompanying notes 201, 243. 
153. See supra text accompanying note 149. 
154. See KHURANA, supra note 148, at 318–19; Jensen,Takeovers, supra note 149, at 29. 
155. See Frank Dobbin & Jiwook Jung, The Misapplication of Mr. Michael Jensen: 
How Agency Theory Brought Down the Economy and Why It Might Again, in 30B MARKETS 
ON TRIAL: THE ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF THE U.S. FINANCIAL CRISIS: PART B 29, 35 (Michael
Lounsbury & Paul M. Hirsch eds., 2010); Jensen, Takeovers, supra note 149, at 28–29; Jensen 
& Meckling, supra note 137, at 323, 353 (including stock options). 
156.  Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 150, at 121. 
157. Gerald F. Davis & Suzanne K. Stout, Organization Theory and the Market for 
Corporate Control: A Dynamic Analysis of the Characteristics of Large Takeover Targets,
1980–1990, 37 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 605, 605 (1992). 
158. Lynn E. Browne & Eric S. Rosengren, The Merger Boom: An Overview, in THE 
MERGER BOOM: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE HELD AT MELVIN VILLAGE, NEW HAMPSHIRE 
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of hostile takeovers, high debt levels, and financial innovation in the form
of junk bonds.159  The Reagan Administration’s lax antitrust enforcement
that made horizontal mergers less likely to be challenged, cuts in corporate
tax rates that provided capital for mergers, and inflation that distorted firm
values also facilitated this merger wave.160  Those firms with managers who 
adopted the shareholder value maximization conception reorganized and 
those that did not became targets.161 For this reason managers had the
incentive to embrace the shareholder value maximization conception of
corporate governance.
However, the evidence does not suggest that managerial self-interest
played a primary role in the formation of conglomerates and the problems 
these firms experienced by the late 1970s.162 This suggests that the foundation
of the shareholder value maximization conception grounded in agency
theory is somewhat shaky and accordingly, also its prescriptions.  The following
analysis demonstrates why this is the case.
First, the stock markets in the 1960s and early 70s responded favorably 
to conglomerate mergers.163  They were “fashionable” during this time period.164 
Firm managers sought to increase the profitability and stability of their 
firms through conglomerate mergers and were rewarded with higher stock
prices.165  For example, on the announcement of diversifying mergers, bidders
OCTOBER 1987, at 1, 2 (Lynn E. Browne & Eric S. Rosengren eds., 1987); Davis et al., The 
Decline and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm, supra note 125, at 548, 559, 561–62; see
Ocasio & Kim, supra note 125, at 538  (discussing the general acceptance by the late 1980s 
of the view that firms should focus on their core competencies). 
159.  Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 150, at 121, 124–27. 
160. Dobbin & Zorn, supra note 151, at 185–86; Fligstein & Markowitz, supra note 
1, at 187 (explaining that high inflation meant that “real assets (i.e., land, buildings, tools)
were increasing in value and at the same time, high interest rates meant that the stock 
market produced lower returns than other forms of investment,” such as bond markets); 
Thomas E. Kauper, The Antitrust “Revolution” and Small Business: On “The Turnpike to 
Efficiencyville,” in LAW AND CLASS IN AMERICA: TRENDS SINCE THE COLD WAR 120, 130– 
31, 135 (Paul D. Carrington & Trina Jones eds., 2006); see Kovacic & Shapiro, supra note 
44, at 52–55. 
161.  Fligstein & Markowitz, supra note 1, at 194, 203. 
162. See infra text accompanying notes 163–221. 
163. See Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 150, at 131; R. Glenn Hubbard & Darius
Palia, A Reexamination of the Conglomerate Merger Wave in the 1960s: An Internal 
Capital Markets View, 54 J. FIN. 1131, 1131–32 (1999); John G. Matsusaka, Takeover
Motives During the Conglomerate Merger Wave, 24 RAND J. ECON. 357, 358 (1993). 
164. Hurley, supra note 130, at 185. 
165. Hubbard & Palia, supra note 163, at 1131–32, 1134. 
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experienced abnormal positive returns.166 These returns were higher for 
conglomerate mergers than related-product mergers.167  Thus managers were
not simply furthering their self-interest in forming conglomerates.168 They
were responding to signals from the stock market. 
Second, industry leaders, the business press and leading economist, 
such as Oliver Williamson and Armen Alchian, expounded at that time on 
the efficiencies to be derived from conglomerates, including efficiencies 
in capital access, capital allocation, risk spreading, and managerial
accountability.169  Conglomerates would enable small and medium-sized
firms, who became divisions of conglomerates, greater access to capital
and assist in their survival.170 Firms with high cash flow volatility that
could not access public markets directly could do so indirectly by becoming 
part of a conglomerate that had access to public markets.171  The pooling 
of profits from these divisions would also allow the central office to make
 166. Id. at 1131. 
167. Id. at 1131–32. 
168. See Neil Fligstein & Peter Brantley, Bank Control, Owner Control, or Organizational 
Dynamics: Who Controls the Large Modern Corporation?, 98 AM. J. SOC. 280, 287–88,
300, 303 (1992) (finding “no evidence that diversification [was] undertaken by managers 
who act[ed] on their own behalf and against the interests of owners”); Matsusaka, supra
note 163, at 357–58, 364 & tbl.1 (finding that shareholders benefited by the conglomerate 
merger wave in the late 1960s and that markets appeared to dislike “takeovers that were 
motivated to discipline target management”).
169. Dobbin & Zorn, supra note 151, at 185; see Hurley, supra note 130, at 185–94. 
For a summary of studies modeling diversifying as a value-enhancing strategy, see Jose 
Manuel Campa & Simi Kedia, Explaining the Diversification Discount, 57 J. FIN. 1731, 
1735 (2002).  Economists discussed the informational and monitoring advantages of
conglomerates, including the advantages of internal capital allocations when compared to 
external capital markets. E.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES:ANALYSIS 
AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 158–59, 161–62, 171–75 (1975); Armen A. Alchian, Corporate 
Management and Property Rights, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE 
SECURITIES 337, 337–60 (Henry G. Manne ed., 1969).  For a discussion of the advantages 
and disadvantages of firm diversification, see Campa & Kedia, supra note 169, at 1734–35.
 170. See Hurley, supra note 130, at 189–90.  CEO of the conglomerate International 
Telephone and Telegraph, Harold Geneen, discussed how conglomerates would provide 
access to capital and management expertise:
In picking and choosing what companies to acquire, [we considered] our expertise in
management and [whether] our access to greater financial resources add something to
that particular company.  In most instances, we kept on the same management
and introduced the company’s managers to the ITT system of business plans, detailed
budgets, strict financial controls, and face-to-face General Managers Meetings. 
Hubbard & Palia, supra note 163, at 1133 (quoting Harold Geneen & Alvin Moscow,
MANAGING 206–07 (1984)).
171. See Zsuzsanna Fluck & Anthony W. Lynch, Why Do Firms Merge and Then Divest? 
A Theory of Financial Synergy, 72 J. BUS. 319, 341–42 (1999).  Additional financial
benefits claimed for conglomerates include the greater ease of shifting assets among constituent 
firms compared to independent firms, a greater debt capacity, and the ability to benefit 
from tax loss benefits. Id. at 324–25. 
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capital available to those divisions with the most attractive business 
opportunities.172  The informational and monitoring advantages of allocating 
capital internally within conglomerates were viewed as overshadowing
the advantages of accessing external capital markets, possibly due to the less 
developed capital markets during this period.173  That capital access was 
an important motive for mergers in the 1960s is shown by a study that found
that highest bidder returns were from mergers of financially constrained
targets with financially unconstrained buyers.174  Conglomerate mergers
were more likely than product-related mergers to involve the acquisition 
of financially distressed firms.175 Conglomerates also moderate risk in times
of economic downturn “for each unit is buoyed by its stronger units,”
contributing to the stability of the firm.176 
It was also generally believed that profits would be enhanced by the 
managerial advantages of conglomerates. For example, superior management
teams could be deployed as needed in the various divisions, less able managers
removed, and cost savings gained by having some common functions performed
at the central corporate level, such as advertising, research and development,
and finance.177 An executive explained in 1968:
I would say that it would be worthwhile for people to sit down and study the 
operating margins of companies that Teledyne, Litton [and Monogram Industries]
have taken over with their bright young management teams.  I would submit that 
you will find sharp increases in efficiency.  I’ve seen this in many cases, and even
though these businesses may be in disparate fields, the ingredient of more aggressive, 
sophisticated management with use of new techniques has made a positive contribution.
I submit that many of these conglomerates will be considerably stronger in a period
of recession than the individual units would have been left on their own.178 
Third, contributing to the poor performance of firms in the 1970s were 
macroeconomic and industry shocks for which managers were not responsible. 
These included the unsettling abandonment of the Bretton Woods system 
172. See Hurley, supra note 130, at 189–91 (noting that divisions would not only
need to compete with other divisions for resources, but also with outside target companies 
that its firm may acquire that offer better investment opportunities). 
173. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 169, at 161–62 (discussing the advantages of internal 
information); Hubbard & Palia, supra note 163, at 1138. 
174. See Hubbard & Palia, supra note 163, at 1131. 
175. See id. at 1147. 
176. Dobbin & Jung, supra note 155, at 45. 
177. Hurley, supra note 130, at 191–93. 
178. Id. at 188 (quoting Samuel N. Seidman, The Role of the Investment Banker in 
Corporate Consolidation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
82, 98 (Allan Easton & Arnold Broser eds., 1970)). 
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of fixed currency exchange rates in the early 1970s, the oil shocks during 
the 1970s—the 1973 OPEC embargo and the 1978-79 Iranian oil-export 
cutoff—that particularly affected the oil industry, high inflation, deregulation
in such industries as airlines and trucking, and fierce international competition 
from Japan and Europe.179  For example, one study of 3,660 firms in 46 industries
found that takeovers and restructuring in the 1982 to 1989 period were 
clustered in those industries that experienced greatest economic shocks.180 
Thus, broad-based fundamental factors contributed to the takeovers and
restructuring of conglomerates formed in the 1960s and 70s.181 
Fourth, agency theorists criticized managers of conglomerates for investing 
in negative cash flow projects and for their failure to downsize their firms.182 
However, a retrospective study of the 1980s merger wave has examined 
the use of free cash flow by managers of target firms.183 There is evidence
that target firms did not make significantly different capital expenditures 
than their industry peers; this was also true for targets of hostile takeovers 
and firms that went private.184  There is some evidence of overinvestments
by large firm targets and firms in the oil and gas industry, with the large
firm findings driven by oil and gas targets.185  However, the premiums in 
1980s takeovers do not appear to be related to industry or firm overinvestment
even for large targets, indicating that overinvestments by managers may
not have motivated these acquisitions.186 
Fifth, downsizing was not the norm in the 1960s and 70s.187  As Professor
Michael Useem explains, “While diversification had been a hallmark of 
179. See Cheffins, Corporate Governance, supra note 16, at 735; Fligstein & Brantley, 
supra note 168, at 303; Fligstein & Markowitz, supra note 1, at 187, 189, 204–05; Gomory
& Sylla, supra note 115, at 107; Ocasio & Kim, supra note 125, at 538 (discussing the impact
of competition on a search for new theories of good corporate governance).
180. Mark L. Mitchell & J. Harold Mulherin, The Impact of Industry Shocks on Takeover
and Restructuring Activity, 41 J. FIN. ECON 193, 210–11, 211 tbl.7, 221 (1996) (taking into 
account shocks such as changes in sales and employment, volatile oil prices, deregulation, 
and innovation in junk bond financing). 
181. Additionally, antitrust policy and the cost of capital were important factors. See
Margaret Blair, CORP. GOVERNANCE, http://www.corpgov.net/education/conversations/
margaret-blair/ [https://perma.cc/NFE5-YR3B].  The cost of capital is dependent on macroeconomic
factors, such as interest rates and tax rates. See Fligstein & Markowitz, supra note 1, at 
193. 
182. See Henri Servaes, Do Takeover Targets Overinvest?, 7 REV. FIN. STUD. 253, 255 
(1994).  For a summary of mixed evidence regarding this theory, see id. at 254. 
in firms in oil and gas industry only).
 183. See id.
 184. See id. at 262–65. 
185. See id. at 265, 275.  See also Jensen, supra note 142, at 327 (discussing overinvestment
186. See Servaes, supra note 182, at 269. 
187. See Art Budros, A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Why Organizations 
Downsize, 10 ORG. SCI. 69, 70, 78 (1999) (stating that before the 1980s downsizing was a 
temporary response to economic conditions, but became “in fashion” by the mid-1980s 
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good management during the 1960s, shedding unrelated businesses had
become the measure during the 1980s and 1990s.”188 For example, because
firms that were larger were viewed as more successful in the 1960s, any 
workforce downsizing that occurred tended to be limited in size and temporary 
in nature.189 The reverse was the case in the 1980s.190  Since the 1980s, stock 
prices go up when a firm as part of its restructuring fires its workers.191 
Focusing on core competencies, cutting costs, and decreasing corporate
assets to enhance the firm’s return on assets win stock market approval.192 
Managers are not solely to blame for these changing norms that are based
on rationalized responses to the demands of different times.  For the most
part, in both time periods, in the 1960s and 70s and since the 1980s, managers 
responded to different conceptions of good corporate governance and the 
social reflection of these conceptions in stock market prices.
and thereafter became “business-as-usual”); Jiwook Jung, Shareholder Value and Workforce 
Downsizing, 1981–2006, 93 SOC. FORCES 1335, 1336 (2015) (“Before the 1980s, managers 
engaged in downsizing only reluctantly because, at that time, expanding the size of a firm
was the hallmark of successful management.  The recent prevalence of downsizing suggests
that managers have changed their attitude toward downsizing and have embraced it as
a value-enhancing strategy”). 
188. MICHAEL USEEM, INVESTOR CAPITALISM: HOW MONEY MANAGERS ARE CHANGING 
THE FACE OF CORPORATE AMERICA 153 (1996). 
189. See Budros, supra note 187, at 70 (“Fundamental differences distinguish
[permanent] layoffs from those executed before the 1980s.  Although deliberate, the latter
tended to occur during short-term economic slumps and thus tended to be temporary in 
nature.  The aim was not to create smaller organization (downsizing through layoffs), but 
to adjust employment levels downward until business conditions recovered.” (citing Kim 
S. Cameron et al., Downsizing and Redesigning Organizations, in  ORGANIZATIONAL
CHANGE AND REDESIGN: IDEAS AND INSIGHTS FOR IMPROVING PERFORMANCE 19, 20–21 
(George P. Huber & William H. Glick eds., 1993); Wayne F. Cascio, Downsizing: What 
Do We Know? What Have We Learned?, 7 EXECUTIVE 95, 95, 99 (1993) (noting that “[i]n
many cases . . . the gains [from downsizing] are short-lived, for despite all of the layoffs, 
automation, and just-in-time inventory management, U.S. nonfarm productivity rose a 
scant 1.2% a year during the 1980s. That’s almost no improvement from the 1970s.”)). 
190. See Davis et al., The Decline and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm, supra note 
125, at 548; Fligstein & Markowitz, supra note 1, at 189–90.
 191. See USEEM, supra note 188, at 146 (noting that the stock prices go down, however,
when downsizing is merely cost cutting and not part of a general restructuring); Gerald F.
Davis, Can an Economy Survive Without Corporations? Technology and Robust Organizational 
Alternatives, 30 ACAD.MGMT.PERSP.129, 133 (2016); Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate 
Law in a New Gilded Age, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 12 (2008); Jung, supra note 187,
at 1338. 
192. See Fligstein & Markowitz, supra note 1, at 191–94; Zorn, supra note 4, at 348.
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Sixth, while conglomerates have been viewed as problematic due to the
diversification discount,193 studies have shown that the act of diversifying
does not necessarily explain the discount.194  For example, one study found 
that one-half of the discount for business segment-increasing firms was 
due to the addition of divisions that were already discounted.195 Thus, there 
are systematic differences between conglomerate divisions and typical
stand-alone firms to which they were benchmarked in previous studies.196 
Moreover, recent studies have questioned the methodology used to compare
conglomerates to stand-alone firms that raise questions about “whether 
the conglomerate discount is a real empirical phenomenon or an artifact 
of the measurement process.”197 There is also contrary authority to the 
traditional view198 that 1960–70s conglomerates performed worse than their
more focused counterparts.199  Even if they performed poorly, claims that
193. For a review of the literature on the diversification discount, see generally Vojislav 
Maksimovic & Gordon M. Phillips, Conglomerate Firms, Internal Capital Markets and The
Theory of the Firm, 5 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 225 (2013). 
194. John R. Graham et al., Does Corporate Diversification Destroy Value?, 57 J. 
FIN. 695, 697 (2002) (summarizing studies); see Campa & Kedia, supra note 169, at 1732– 
33 (stating that although conglomerates have been discredited due to a diversification 
discount, the discount may be related less to diversification than the characteristics of firms 
that decide to diversify).  The study found that when exogenous characteristics were controlled
for, “the diversification discount always drops, and sometimes turns into a premium.” 
Campa & Kedia, supra note 169, at 731. 
195.  Graham et al., supra note 194, at 715–17. 
196. Id. at 710, 718. 
197. Maksimovic & Phillips, supra note 193, at 228. See also John E. Hund et al., 
A Manufactured Diversification Discount (Dec. 16, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2535017
[https://perma.cc/SSN3-4DXD]. 
198. Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical
Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895, 903–05 (1992) (“The evidence that corporate diversification
reduces company value is consistent and collectively damning.”); Davis et al., The Decline
and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm, supra note 125, at 548 (explaining that conglomerates 
were generally viewed as a collective error made by U.S. business persons) (citing Your 
Obedient Servant, ECONOMIST, Apr. 27, 1991, at 43, 44). 
199. See Pieter T. Elgers & John J. Clark, Merger Types and Shareholder Returns: 
Additional Evidence, 9 FIN. MGMT. 66, 72 (1980) (finding that for the period 1956–1975
“conglomerate mergers showed superior wealth effects for both buyer and seller shareholders,
compared to non-conglomerate mergers”); Fligstein & Brantley, supra note 168, at 300 
(stating that in the 1970s “firms with product-unrelated strategies did no worse or no better 
than firms with product-dominant strategies”).  There is also contrary authority for the view 
that poorly performing conglomerates explain the 1980s merger wave.  See, e.g., Dobbin
& Jung, supra note 155, at 44 (discussing mixed evidence on the efficiency of deconglomeration); 
Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 150, at 131 (noting that “empirical results suggest that 
deconglomeration played a role in the 1980s takeovers, but was probably not the primary
driver”); Belen Villalonga, Does Diversification Cause the Diversification Discount?, 33
FIN. MGMT. 5 (2004) (finding that diversification does not destroy value for 1978–97 mergers). 
There is considerable controversy over the benefits and costs of conglomerates and whether
conglomerates add value.  See, e.g., Campa & Kedia, supra note 169, at 1734–35 (explaining
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the primary cause was managerial self-interest falter if managers merely
overestimated their ability to oversee widely diversified businesses at
least with the communications and computer technology available to them 
at the time.200 
Seventh, the shift towards institutional share ownership in firms contributed 
to the takeovers of the 1980s and the busting up of conglomerates.201  The
ownership of large blocks of stock by institutional investors enabled firms 
to be bought and sold with greater ease by hostile takeover firms.202 
Institutional investors were large investors in buyout funds and junk bonds.203 
Junk bonds that are risky, high yield bonds were popularized by Drexel 
Burnham Lambert and were a currency of choice for takeovers during this
period, enabling large firms to be taken over by smaller, highly leveraged
firms.204  These developments were foreshadowed by various events in 
the 1970s that were outside of firm managers’ control.  For example, the
passage of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 created
funding requirements for firms’ retirement plans that increased the institutional 
investors’ pool of assets to invest.205  Moreover, the abolition of fixed brokerage
commission rates, which became effective on May 1, 1975 (May Day), 
increased competition among institutional investors and stock turnover, 
resulting in investors focusing more on stock appreciation rather than 
dividends.206  Additionally, the deconstruction of the Bretton Wood system
the benefits and costs of conglomeration); Maksimovic & Phillip, supra note 193 (summarizing
studies on conglomerates). 
200. See Lazonick & O’Sullivan, supra note 142, at 15. 
201.  Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 150, at 132. 
202. Id.
 203. USEEM, supra note 188, at 2, 25, 26; Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 150, at 
132; Lazonick & O’Sullivan, supra note 142, at 16 (discussing the role of takeover specialty
firms); Batt & Appelbaum, supra note 111, at 9–10, 12. A significant takeover firm during 
this period was Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., which popularized the use of leveraged
buyouts. Batt & Appelbaum, supra note 111, at 11. 
204. Dobbin & Zorn, supra note 151, at 185; Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 150, 
at 125. 
205. PAVLOS E. MASOUROS, CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMIC STAGNATION: HOW
SHAREHOLDER VALUE AND SHORT-TERMISM CONTRIBUTE TO THE DECLINE OF THE WESTERN 
ECONOMIES 82–83 (2013); Batt & Appelbaum, supra note 111, at 9 (discussing changes
in ERISA requirements in 1974 and 1978 and changes in regulations of savings and loan 
institutions); Lazonick & O’Sullivan, supra note 142, at 17 (discussing changes with ERISA 
that allowed pension funds and insurance companies to invest in equities and risky securities, 
such as junk bonds, and the Garn–St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 that 
allowed savings and loan institutions to invest in junk bonds). 
206. MASOUROS, supra note 205, at 81. 
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of fixed currency exchange rates in the early 1970s introduced “greater 
instability and unpredictability in financial markets” leading to more
short-term investment strategies by investors.207 
Institutional investors also played a role in de-diversification in the 1980s
because they viewed it as their role rather than the firm’s role to diversify 
portfolios.208  They did not need firms to perform this function. As far as
investors were concerned, it was not necessary for single firms to reduce
risk by becoming conglomerates when they as shareholders could easily
reduce their risk by diversifying their individual portfolios.  It was also 
much easier for institutional investors to perform the diversifying function 
when firms were single product firms.209 
Additionally, securities analysts became increasingly important in evaluating 
stock in the 1980s.210  From the late 1970s to the early 1990s the number
of security analysts following typical firm leaders increased from eight to 
eighteen.211 Analysts specialized by industry and were therefore less likely 
to follow conglomerates.212  Conglomerates were difficult for these specialists
to value.213  Evidence shows that firms followed by fewer analysts experienced 
lower stock valuations.214  Managers in the 1960s and 70s were not responsible
for these developments.  Firms were motivated to de-conglomerate to stimulate 
institutional investor interest, increase analysts’ coverage, and avoid hostile 
takeovers.215 
Finally, a short-termism orientation most likely contributed more than 
managerial self-interest to the poor performance of firms in the managerial 
era of the 1960s and 70s.  In 1980 two Harvard Business School professors,
 207. Id. at 57–59. 
208.  Dobbin & Zorn, supra note 151, at 189–90. 
209. See id. at 190.  From 1981 to 1987, Fortune 500 firms with large blocks of stock
held in a few hands were more likely to decrease their diversification than other firms.  USEEM,
supra note 188, at 153. 
210. See Dobbin & Zorn, supra note 151, at 190–91. 
211. Id. at 191 (citing Zorn et al., Managing Investors: How Financial Markets Reshaped 
the American Firm, in  THE SOCIOLOGY OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 269, 275 (Karin Knorr
Cetina & Alexandru Preda eds., 2005)).
212. USEEM, supra note 188, at 153; Dobbin & Zorn, supra note 151, at 191. 
213.  Dobbin & Zorn, supra note 151, at 191. 
214. See Ezra W. Zuckerman, The Categorical Imperative: Security Analysts and the
Illegitimacy Discount, 104 AM. J. SOC. 1398, 1398 (1999) (finding that from 1985 to 1994, 
“the stock price of an American firm was discounted to the extent that the firm was not 
covered by securities analysts who specialized in its industries”); see also Ezra W. Zuckerman, 
Focusing the Corporate Product: Securities Analysts and De-Diversification, 45 ADMIN.
SCI. Q. 591, 614–15 (2000) (concluding that investors pressured firms to abide by “systems 
of classification, currently dominated by industry-based categories,” so that “change [in] 
a firm’s corporate strategy [could not] be reduced to efficiency-based considerations”).
215. Dobbin & Jung, supra note 155, at 42–43; Dobbin & Zorn, supra note 151, at 
191. 
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Professors Hayes and Abernathy, wrote an influential article, Managing
Our Way to Economic Decline, sending shock waves through the business 
community.216 They set forth graphs and charts showing the rise of finance
presidents and the dramatic decline in productivity and long- term investments 
by U.S. firms when compared to their foreign counterparts.217  They pointed
to the analytical detachment of top managers from the actual operations
of their firms.218  They criticized managers’ use of short-term financial 
controls and their focus on making cost reductions rather than long­
term investments.219  They were concerned about the selection of what they
called “pseudoprofessional[s]” or outsiders for top managerial positions who
had no experience in the particular industry but operated the business 
through the “strict application of financial controls, portfolio concepts,
and market-driven strategy.”220 They also referred to the merger mania of 
the 1960s and 70s.221 They claimed that it was only natural that finance and 
legal presidents would focus on financial activities and the quicker results 
associated with mergers and acquisitions rather than the more unglamorous, 
arduous task of building in-house technology.222 




The portfolio management approach declined in legitimacy with the criticisms 
of conglomerates.223  Consequently, financial presidents lost some ground
in the 1980s in favor of presidents with operating backgrounds.224  One
216. Robert H. Hayes & William J. Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, 
HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 1980, at 67. 
217. Id. at 69, Ex. I–II, 70 Ex. III, 75 Ex. VI; see also Ocasio & Kim, supra note 
125, at 537–38.  In the 100 largest U.S. firms from 1959–1979, the percentage of finance
presidents increased from 16.1% to 27.5% and generalist from 10.4% to 15.8%. 
Fligstein, The Intraorganizational Power Struggle, supra note 9, at 47 tbl.2.  Lawyer presidents 
were 6.7% in 1979. Id.
218.  Hayes & Abernathy, supra note 216, at 68. 
219. See id. (referring to this approach as “competitive myopia”); Ocasio & Kim, supra
note 125, at 538. 
220.  Hayes & Abernathy, supra note 216, at 74. 
221. See id. at 75–76. 
222. Id. at 75–76. They also believed that U.S. firms, by not focusing on core competencies,
were not able to compete with their more focused, foreign competitors. See id. at 76. 
223.  Ocasio & Kim, supra note 125, at 556–57. 
224. See id. at 547–48, 550, 556–57 (finding that finance presidents in large U.S. 
manufacturing firms decreased from 22% in 1981 to 16% in 1992).  The multidivisional 
form and unrelated diversification important in the 1960s and 1970s to explain the rise of 
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observer stated, “corporate reorganizations associated with the rise
of stockholder interests typically involve large-scale changes in either 
production or operations, strategies typically associated with CEOs from
production or operations backgrounds.”225  However, firms engaging in
large numbers of mergers and acquisitions were as likely to select finance 
CEOs as operations CEOs.226  Moreover, over time MBA identities blurred 
the distinction between operating and finance presidents227 and, additionally, 
firms increasingly created CFO positions.  By 2000, 80% of the 400 largest 
firms had CFOs, a dramatic increase from zero in 1964.228  With the
increasing acceptance of the shareholder value maximization conception, 
the responsibilities of CFOs expanded to deal with investor relations and
financial analysts, and to manage stock market expectations.229 
Moreover, firms selected outsider CEOs more frequently as managerial 
capitalism was replaced with investor capitalism.230  While less than 20%
of CEO succession events resulted in outsider CEOs in the early 1980s, 
this percentage increased to 50% in the mid-1990s and remained in the 
range of 30% to 40% thereafter.231  The explanation given for the selection 
of outsiders is the belief that insiders have irrational connections to people 
and products.232  Thus, downsizing that has become the strategy of choice 
since the 1980s is furthered by the choice of outsiders.  The selection of
outsiders is intended to “send[] a strong message [to stock markets] that the 
firm is firmly committed” to initiate and implement strategic changes.233 
Firm-specific knowledge is viewed of less importance in the selection of 
an outsider CEO.234  Thus, promotion to the CEO position from within
became less the norm as boards looked outward often to find charismatic 
finance CEOs were no longer associated with finance presidents during the 1980s and 
1990s. Id. at 552, 556.  One study indicates that finance presidents were unfairly judged.
See Fligstein & Brantley, supra note 168, at 303 (finding that “financially oriented executives
who ran diversified firms and engaged in mergers outperformed their brethren, on the average”). 
When a sufficiently large number of firms choose to adopt a strategy, the president’s background
is less important to a firm’s choice of strategy.  See Fligstein, The Structural Transformation of
American Industry, supra note 4, at 324. 
225.  Ocasio & Kim, supra note 125, at 539. 
226. Id. at 550–52. 
227. Id. at 557. 
228. Zorn, supra note 4, at 346. 
229. See id. at 352, 362. 
230. See Jiwook Jung, Political Contestation at the Top: Politics of Outsider Succession 
at U.S. Corporations, 35 ORG. STUD. 727, 729 (2014) (discussing how this is associated 
with the power of institutional investors and outsider-dominated boards of directors). 
231. Id. at 729–30, 730 fig.1.
232. See id. at 729. 
233. Id.
 234. See id.
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leaders with a new vision for the future of their firms and who would
receive the approbation of investors, analysts, and the business press.235 
Many managers initially opposed hostile takeovers that were believed
by agency theorists to enhance shareholder value by displacing bad managers.236 
Managers utilized defensive tactics and were successful in urging states 
to adopt anti-takeover statutes, including constituency statutes that permitted
managers to act in the interests of firm stakeholders.237 While managers’ 
success in defending anti-takeover devices was mixed, the use of these devices 
made hostile takeover more costly.238  However, by the 1990s managers
in varying degrees, and more significantly their boards of directors,239 came
to accept the legitimacy of the new shareholder value maximization conception 
of corporate governance.240  Merger activity continued in the 1990s, although 
with less hostility.241  Some suggest that substantial compensation packages
with large amounts of stock options influenced this change.242  However, 
235. See RAKESH KHURANA, SEARCHING FOR A CORPORATE SAVIOR: THE IRRATIONAL 
QUEST FOR CHARISMATIC CEOS 71, 78–79 (2002); Khurana, supra note 113, at 62. 
236. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 141, at 1168–69; Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (1982). 
237. See Brian R. Cheffins, The History of Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 46, 52–53 (Mike Wright et al. eds., 2013) [hereinafter 
Cheffins, The History of Corporate Governance]; see also Lynne L. Dallas, The New 
Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1374
n.31 (2002) [hereinafter Dallas, The New Managerialism] (noting defensive tactics utilized
by managers and statutory limitations on corporate takeovers). 
238. A complex jurisprudence developed.  The Supreme Court struck down the first 
generation of state anti-takeover statutes in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 
(1982). However, the Court upheld the second generation of state anti-takeover statutes
in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 70 (1987).  The Delaware courts gave
managers considerable discretion in utilizing defensive tactics under an enhanced business 
judgment rule. E.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 946 (Del. 1985). 
However, the Delaware courts required directors to maximize shareholder value in some
situations. E.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 173 
(Del. 1986).  States adopted a variety of anti-takeover statutes, such as control share acquisition
provisions, fair price provisions, and business combination statutes. See generally Emiliano M.
Catan & Marcel Kahan, Law and Finance of Antitakeover Statutes, 68 STAN. L. REV. 629 
(2016).
239. Dallas, The New Managerialism, supra note 237, at 1376 (summarizing a 1999
survey of directors of major U.S. firms that confirmed a “‘cultural’ change” on boards of 
directors in their recognition of their duty owed to shareholders (quoting KORN/FERRY 
INT’L, 26TH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 5 (1999))). 
240. Dobbin & Zorn, supra note 151, at 181, 183; Cheffins, The History of Corporate 
Governance, supra note 237, at 53, 56. 
241.  Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 150, at 132–33. 
242. E.g., id. at 122. 
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the firm environment had also changed.  Institutional stock ownership 
increased from 30% to 50% from 1980s to 1996.243  With the legitimacy 
provided by agency theory, laws and practices also were adopted that enhanced
the power of institutional investors who demanded high returns.244  The
adoption of the shareholder value maximization conception is reflected in 
a 1999 survey of directors of major U.S. firms confirming a “‘cultural’
change” on boards of directors in recognizing their duty owed to
shareholders.245 
Structurally, the busting up of the conglomerates heralded a period,
accelerated during the 1990s and continuing today, of disaggregation,
including vertical disintegration and outsourcing by firms, in order to 
maximize shareholder value.246  Approximately one-fourth of Fortune 500 
firms disappeared as independent entities in the 1980s mainly due to de­
conglomeration.247  By the late 1980s managers of firms in general believed
they should focus on their firm’s core business.248 
Thus, managers at many major firms viewed good corporate governance 
as subcontracting out all but core functions to subsidiaries or outside firms.249 
They sought to decrease their uncertainty by acquiring flexibility in 
an environment of rapidly changing technology, financial markets, and consumer
tastes.250  Moreover, they sought to impress the stock markets and activist
shareholders who favored firms that had high returns on their tangible
243. Paul Gompers & Andrew Metrick, Institutional Investors and Equity Prices, 
116 Q.J. ECON. 229, 237 fig.1 (2001). 
244. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 147, at 562–70; Kahan & Rock, supra note 
147, at 1007–19. 
245. Dallas, The New Managerialism, supra note 237, at 1376 (quoting KORN/FERRY INT’L, 
supra note 239, at 5). 
246. See Gerald F. Davis et al., Political Agency and the Responsibility Paradox:
Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility, in CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL AGENCY:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 93, 98 (Bice Maiguashca & Raffaele Marchetti eds., 2013) [hereinafter
Davis et al., Political Agency]; Norman Jones, The Hollow Corporation, BUS. WK., Mar.
3, 1986, at 57, 58. 
247. Davis et al., Decline and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm, supra note 125, at 561–62. 
248. Id.; see Ocasio & Kim, supra note 125, at 538) (discussing the general acceptance 
by the late 1980s of the view that firms should focus on their core competencies); see also
Batt & Appelbaum, supra note 111, at 11–12 (noting that 1980s mergers “were primarily
horizontal mergers” and discussing the decline in firm diversification). 
249. See N. Anand & Richard L. Daft, What Is the Right Organizational Design?, 
36 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 329, 335–36, 335 tbl.2, 337 tbl.3 (2007); Rosabeth Moss 
Kanter, The Future of Bureaucracy and Hierarchy in Organizational Theory: A Report 
from the Field, in SOCIAL THEORY FOR A CHANGING SOCIETY 63, 68 (Pierre Bourdieu & 
James S. Coleman eds., 1991) (referring to a “switchboard” firm); S. Tully & T. Welsh, The
Modular Corporation, FORTUNE, Feb. 8, 1993, at 106. 
250. See Larry Hirschhorn & Thomas Gilmore, The New Boundaries of the “Boundaryless” 
Company, HARV. BUS. REV., May–June 1992, at 104, 104–05; Jones, supra note 246, at 
58. 
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assets.251  Thus, they had an incentive to shed assets.  Rather than growth, 
previously valued by firms, shareholder value maximization resulted in 
firms adopting cost cutting measures to meet or beat the quarterly earnings 
expectations of the stock market.
By engaging in contracting out all but core functions to outside firms, 
many large firms have become “hubs” of vast networks, essentially
functioning as management or systems integration firms, exemplifying a
process often referred to as “Nikefication.”252  These networks consist of
suppliers, dealers and even competitors—with whom they engage in joint
research and product development—through partnerships, joint ventures, 
and strategic alliances.253 The core functions they retain are often marketing, 
finance, and sometimes product design and R&D.254  They often manage
intangible assets such as brand names, trademarks, patents, and research
capabilities.255  For example, Nike focuses on design and marketing.256 
Coca-Cola Company primarily engages in managing its brand name.257 
As for Hewlett-Packard Company, one of its vice presidents explains: 
“We own all of the intellectual property; we farm out all of the direct 
labor. We don’t need to screw the motherboard into the metal box and 
attach the ribbon cable” to create an HP computer.258  In some industries 
251. See Benito Arruñada & Xosé H. Vázquez, When Your Contract Manufacturer
Becomes Your Competitor, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2006, at 135, 139–40; Gerald F. Davis, 
The Rise and Fall of Finance and the End of the Society of Organizations, 23 ACAD.
MGMT. PERSP. 27, 34 (2009) [hereinafter Davis, The Rise and Fall of Finance].
252. See Gerald F. Davis, What Might Replace the Modern Corporation? Uberization 
and the Web Page Enterprise, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 501, 510–11 (2016) [hereinafter 
Davis, What Might Replace the Modern Corporation?] (discussing “Nikefication”); Claire
Moore Dickerson, Spinning Out of Control: The Virtual Organization and Conflicting 
Governance Vectors, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 759, 762 (1998) (discussing firms acting as “hubs”);
Kanter, supra note 249, at 68 (referring to a “switchboard” firm). 
253. John A. Byrne, The Virtual Corporation, BUS. WK., Feb. 8, 1993, at 98, 99; see 
Kanter, supra note 249, at 70–72, 74; Kevin Kelly et al., Learning from Japan, BUS. WK., 
Jan. 27, 1992, at 52, 52–53. 
254. See Arruñada & Vázquez, supra note 251, at 136; Kanter, supra note 249, at 
68; Tully & Welsh, supra note 249, at 106.  “R&D” refers to research and development. 
(July 26, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/07/26/business/is-this-the-factory-of-the­
255. 
256. 
See Davis, The Rise and Fall of Finance, supra note 251, at 33. 
Id.
 257. Id.
 258. Id. at 34 (quoting Saul Hansell, Is This the Factory of the Future, N.Y. TIMES
future.html [https://perma.cc/LNT4-PSMB]). 
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manufacturing has been outsourced to low-wage countries and in other 
industries to generic manufacturing plants.259 
As a result of disaggregation, many major U.S. firms providing manufactured 
products have become “hollow” corporations, a term used to describe firms
with no manufacturing operations.260  Fierce cost cutting has resulted in 
the gutting of managerial layers and the firing of workers from major 
firms.261  Manufacturing jobs that used to provide employees considerable
security in employment and opportunities for advancement have declined.262 
Manufacturing jobs have declined more dramatically since the late 1970s,
and this trend has accelerated in the twenty-first century.263  Employees
have increasingly turned to the service sector for employment.264  Many
jobs themselves have changed as communication technologies have permitted
automated monitoring of employees from remote locations.265 
The disaggregation of firms through outsourcing has cost savings advantages 
at least in the short-term.  The outsourcing of functions to specialty firms 
can create cost efficiencies because of the unique expertise, operating
procedures, and culture associated with separate specialties.266  Firms may 
outsource their data processing services to data processing service firms,
their security to outside security firms, secretarial work to temp worker firms,
product assembly to component assembly firms, and so on.  Moreover, the
firms acquire access to critical resources often without ownership or hierarchical 
relationships.267  While these developments seem to fulfill the nexus of 
259. See id. Competing firms often have overlapping supply chains. See James B.
Rice, Jr. & Richard M. Hoppe, Supply Chain vs. Supply Chain: The Hype & the Reality, 
SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. REV. 46, 49 (2001).  Some firms such as Uber Technologies, Inc.
outsource tasks to individuals rather than to firms by providing smartphone applications.
See Davis, What Might Replace the Modern Corporation?, supra note 252, at 511, 512– 
13. 
260. Anand & Daft, supra note 249, at 334; Byrne, supra note 253, at 101; Jones, supra
note 246, at 57; see Dickerson, supra note 252, at 277. 
261. See Kanter, supra note 249, at 76–78. 
262. Jung, supra note 187, at 1336.  Men entering the workforce in the 1980s and 90s 
were more likely to be employed in entry level jobs ten years later than in prior decades. 
Davis, The Rise and Fall of Finance, supra note 251, at 35. 
263. Martin Neil Bailey & Barry P. Bosworth, US Manufacturing: Understanding
Its Past and Its Political Future, 28 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 4 fig.1 (2014). 
264. See infra note 436.  Uberization is a special case that provides intermittent work- 
for-pay tasks performed without security or benefits.  Davis, What Might Replace the Modern 
Corporation?, supra note 252, at 512–13. 
265. See Davis, What Might Replace the Modern Corporation?, supra note 252, at 511– 
13. 
266. See Kanter, supra note 249, at 70, 77. 
267. Virgile Chassagnon, The Network-Firm as a Single Real Entity: Beyond the 
Aggregate of Distinct Legal Entities, 45 J. ECON. ISSUES 113, 114–15, 119 (2011).  This is
also true for uberization that facilitates the use of previously unused physical and human 
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contract conception of the firms, these relationships are not usually strictly 
market transactions—such as wheat or stock market transactions—but
require monitoring, and some of them are often long term and quite
open-ended.268 Some firms that outsource manufacturing to suppliers have
taken a page from the Japanese playbook by decreasing their practice of 
selecting suppliers through competitive bidding and cultivating long-term 
relationships with them in order to encourage production innovations.269 
Although resource dependencies among the parties often create disproportionate
power relationships in many cases,270 these supplier relationships rely on 
mutual dependencies, reciprocity, and trust, often difficult for U.S. firms to 
achieve.271 Such relationships when nurtured can produce collaborative
efficiencies and innovation.272  They can also produce disadvantages when
not properly implemented.273  Such relationships may lead to the loss of
in-house skills and innovative capacity.274  They may reduce control over
supply and increase the risk of suppliers supplanting the outsourcing firm.275 
Moreover, they involve substantial monitoring costs and, if not nurtured, 
may lead to a decline in investments by suppliers in production technologies.276 
In summary, from an agency perspective the central issue of corporate
governance is managerial self-interest.  This has created a focus on maximizing 
shareholder value. The main structural development has been disaggregation
assets without the firm owning or purportedly employing them.  Davis, What Might Replace 
the Modern Corporation?, supra note 252, at 502. 
268. See Arruñada & Vázquez, supra note 251, at 138–40 (discussing the importance 
of monitoring and different kinds of supplier relationships); Kanter, supra note 249, at 70; 
Robert D. Hof, Novellus: Thriving—With a Little Help from Its Friends, BUS. WK., Jan. 
27, 1992, at 60; Kelly et al., supra note 253, at 54, 59. 
269. See Hof, supra note 268, at 60; Kelly et al., supra note 253, at 54, 59. 
270. Chassagnon, supra note 267, at 114–15, 119. 
271. See id. at 119; Kanter, supra note 249, at 72; see also Jeffrey K. Liker & Thomas 
Y. Choi, Building Deep Supplier Relationships, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2004, at 104
(criticizing U.S. auto manufacturers for their failure to create the kinds of successful 
relationships that Toyota and Honda create with their suppliers). 
272.  Arruñada & Vázquez, supra note 251, at 138; see Kanter, supra note 249, at 73. 
273. See Anand & Daft, supra note 249, at 336; Kanter, supra note 249, at 72; Raymond 
E. Miles & Charles C. Snow, Causes of Failure in Network Organizations, CAL. MGMT. REV.,
Summer 1992, at 53, 63, 64 tbl.2.
 274. Anand & Daft, supra note 249, at 336; see Arruñada & Vázquez, supra note 
251, at 137–39 (discussing the risk of infringement of intellectual property). 
275. See Anand & Daft, supra note 249, at 336; Arruñada & Vázquez, supra note 
251, at 137; Byrne, supra note 253, at 100. 
276. See Anand & Daft, supra note 249, at 336; Byrne, supra note 253, at 102 (noting
monitoring needed when production is not up and running on time). 
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through vertical disaggregation, outsourcing, and offshoring to achieve 
expected efficiencies. While developments in technology, globalization, 
and competition have contributed to disaggregation, it has been exaggerated 
by the adoption of the shareholder value maximization conception.277  In
the next Part I discuss how firms have adopted agency theory prescriptions, 
such as substantial managerial compensation packages to align managerial
compensation with stock prices, high leverage, large dividend payouts, and 
stock buybacks.  I also discuss corporate cultures that have changed to
focus on the short-term and a legislative agenda supportive of activism by
short-term shareholders. 
Before doing so, however, I point out unintended consequences of firms
focusing on their core competencies and expanding horizontally in the 
face of lax antitrust enforcement.  Since the late 1990s firms have grown 
mainly through horizontal mergers and acquisitions to maximize their core
competencies, create synergies, increase their market share and market
power, and cut costs through the elimination of redundancies.278  First,  
these acquisitions have resulted in a decrease in listed public firms from 
1996 to 2012 as public firms have acquired other public firms, forming larger 
firms.279  Second, the rapid pace of merger and acquisition activity in the
twenty-first century has enhanced further high industry concentration levels.280 
There is evidence that a significant portion of mergers result in higher 
277. See infra text accompanying notes 428, 429.
278. Davis et al., Political Agency, supra note 246, at 99; Kanter, supra note 249, at 
66; Business in America: Too Much of a Good Thing, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21695385-profits-are-too-high-america-needs­
giant-dose-competition-too-much-good-thing [hereinafter Business in America].
279. Craig Doidge et al., The U.S. Listing Gap, 123 J. FIN. ECON. 464, 464, 466 
(2017). Delisting by public firms accounts for 46% of the general decrease in publicly
listed firms from 1996–2012, largely because of mergers and acquisitions among publicly
listed firms. Id. at 477–79. This study finds that the remaining 54% decrease in listed
firms is accounted for by the low rate of listings by new firms. Id.  For other explanations 
of the listing gap, see Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L. REV.
531, 543–50 (2012). 
280. See Gustavo Grullon et al., Are U.S. Industries Becoming More Concentrated?
1 (Aug. 31, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2612047 [https://perma.cc/3G5R-PA2M]; Business in America, supra note 
278 (noting that two-thirds of industry sectors became more concentrated between 1997–
2012, business lobbying doubled over this period, and since 2008, U.S. firms have engaged
in mergers worth $10 trillion); Neil Howe, Why Markets Keep Concentrating—And How
That Hurts Our Economy, FORBES (Dec. 30, 2015, 11:16 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
neilhowe/2015/12/30/why-markets-keep-concentrating-and-how-that-hurts-our-economy/2/
#42beeda777a6 [https://perma.cc/5TDF-TK4X].  Lax antitrust enforcement has contributed to
this development. See David Dayen, Bring Back Antitrust, AM. PROSPECT (Nov. 9, 2015), 
http://prospect.org/article/bring-back-antitrust-0 [https://perma.cc/BKS5-84M6]. 
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prices for consumers.281  Overall, in a wide range of U.S. business sectors
firms earn abnormal profits, shareholders experience abnormal stock returns,
and these profits do not benefit consumers in the form of lower prices.282 
Large firms with considerable market power, when combined with their 
treatment as persons with constitutional rights, pose considerable societal
challenges requiring rethinking of antitrust regulations and conceptions of 
good corporate governance.283 
In a 2007 retrospective of the 1980 article, Managing Our Way to
Economic Decline, Professor Hayes viewed his earlier article, with coauthor 
Professor Abernathy, as a call for U.S. managers to get back to basics— 
to improve quality, responsiveness and technological innovation.284  But
in this 2007 retrospective he saw U.S. firms, since the late 1990s, as having a
“get-rich-quick, bubble mentality,” resulting in managers turning away
from the “pursuit of operating excellence.”285
 281. John E, Kwoka, Jr., Does Merger Control Work? A Retrospective on U.S. Enforcement 
Actions and Merger Outcomes, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 619, 621, 634 (2013); Dayen, supra note 280. 
282. See Kwoka, Jr., supra note 281, at 621, 634. A recent study found abnormal
profits in industries with decreasing numbers of competitors.  Grullon et al., supra note 
280, at 2.  It also finds abnormal stock returns for shareholders. Id. at 3.  Although the 
source of these abnormal profits is unclear, the profits suggest an increase in market power 
of large firms. Id. at 2, 4.  The study found that the decline in the number of publicly-
listed firms has not been offset by competition from private and foreign firms.  Id.; see 
also Business in America, supra note 278 (providing evidence on the increased domination 
of industries by the top four firms from 1997 to 2012 and abnormal profits); Dayen, note 
280 (explaining that economic consolidation harms consumers, workers and innovators). 
Horizontal mergers among public firms are the major cause of the delisting of public firms 
on national stock exchanges.  See Ashley Lutz, These 6 Corporations Control 90% of the 
Media in America, BUS. INSIDER (June 14, 2012, 9:49 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ 
these-6-corporations-control-90-of-the-media-in-america-2012-6 [https://perma.cc/G5XD­
XPZM] (noting that 6 firms, consolidated from 50 firms in 1983, control 90% of “what we
read, watch, or listen to”); Asher Schechter, Economists: “Totality of Evidence”
Underscores Concentration Problem in the U.S., PRO-MARKET (Mar. 31, 2017), https://
promarket.org/economists-totality-evidence-underscores-concentration-problem-u-s/
[https://perma.cc/87P5-DAYJ] (discussing views at an academic conference on concentration 
evidence, implications of concentration, and advisability of more aggressive antitrust
enforcement).
283. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (finding
that corporations’ political spending was protected by the First Amendment).
284. See Robert H. Hayes, “Managing Our Way. . .” A Retrospective, in Robert H.
Hayes & William J. Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, HARV. BUS.



























    
 
      
        
  
 
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MAXIMIZATION 




I provide below in Part IV.A a comprehensive examination of the major 
consequences of the shareholder value maximization conception of “good” 
corporate governance that sets the stage for a new conception.  In the
course of this analysis, I highlight the significance of the corporate scandals 
of the early 2000s and the financial crisis of 2007-2009.  In Part IV.B I 
offer the sustainability conception as an emerging conception of corporate 
governance and propose reforms that would further support its evolution.
A. The Shareholder Value Maximization Conception 
of “Good” Corporate Governance 
1. Firm Purpose 
As previously discussed, the shareholder value maximization conception 
began to influence business thinking, structures, and strategies in the late 
1970s and is currently the dominant conception, at least in scholarly debates. 
Pronouncements of corporate purpose by the Business Roundtable, a
prestigious association of CEOs of leading U.S. firms, show how the shareholder 
value maximization conception changed corporate purpose and the thinking
of managers.286  In 1981 the Business Roundtable stated “[c]orporations
have a responsibility, first of all, to make available to the public quality
goods and services at a fair prices, thereby earning a profit that attracts 
investment to continue and enhance the enterprise, provide jobs, and build 
the economy.”287  In contrast, in 1997 the Business Roundtable stated that 
“[t]he principal objective of a business enterprise is to generate economic
returns to its owners. If the CEO and the directors are not focused on 
shareholder value, it may be less likely the corporation will realize that 
value.”288  Therefore, rather than managers concentrating on providing quality
goods at fair prices, a reasonable return to shareholders, employment, and 
building the economy, the managers’ purpose became to maximize shareholder 
returns. Many progressive corporate law scholars were critical of this 
approach but were unable to prevent it from becoming generally accepted.289
 286. See Gomory & Sylla, supra note 115, at 107, 109–10. 
287. Id. at 107 (quoting BUS. ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
12 (Oct. 1981)).
288. Id. at 109–10 (quoting BUS. ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
1–2 (Sept. 1997)). 
289. These scholars included Douglas M. Branson, William W. Bratton, Lynne L. Dallas,
Claire Moore Dickerson, Kent Greenfield, Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Lyman P.Q. Johnson,
David Millon, Lawrence E. Mitchell, Marleen A. O’Connor, Eric W. Orts, Terry O’Neill, 
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2. Meeting or Beating Quarterly Earnings Expectations 
The shareholder value maximization conception contributed to negative 
unintended consequences, particularly in encouraging unethical behavior. 
Executive officers and corporate boards came to believe that it was of utmost 
importance that their firms meet the quarterly earnings expectations of
security analysts who influenced the stock prices of their firms.290  They
sought to avoid adverse short-term effects on their businesses and on them
personally, which would occur if they did not meet these expectations.291 
From a business perspective, satisfying stock market expectations signaled to
customers, suppliers, and shareholders that the firm was successful and
assisted in the firms’ ability to succeed, including obtaining financing on 
favorable terms.292  Unsuccessful managers faced the likelihood of being
replaced or having their firms taken over.293 Thus, managers sought to
maximize shareholder value by increasing their firm’s stock price. The
focus on stock price became paramount.  Enron even had a stock ticker
tape in its Houston headquarters’ elevator.294 
Because of the likely adverse consequences to their firms and themselves, 
many managers did whatever it took to meet the numbers.295  Firms  
engaged in numerous transactions, such as mergers and acquisitions, stock 
repurchases, and divestitures, to impress the stock market.296  They
also engaged in what is called “earnings management.”297  They cut discretionary 
spending, such as R&D expenses, and downsized by firing employees in
Faith Stevelman, Kellye Testy, Lynn Stout, Cheryl L. Wade, and Cynthia Williams.  See generally
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON LAW, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY
(Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (including articles from some of these scholars). 
290. Dobbin & Jung, supra note 155, at 39; David Millon, Shareholder Social
Responsibility, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 911, 916–17 (2013) [hereinafter Millon, Shareholder 
Social Responsibility].
291. See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate 
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 271–72 (2012) [hereinafter Dallas, Short-Termism].
292. See id. at 271; Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, supra note 290, at 
915. 
293. Dallas, Short-Termism, supra note 291, at 272. 
294. Sverre Rørvik Nilsen, The Enron Code of Ethics Handbook from July 2000 Is 
a Fascinating Read, CFAINST.BLOG (Oct. 14, 2013), https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2013/
10/14/the-enron-code-of-ethics-handbook-from-july-2000-is-a-fascinating-read/ [https://
perma.cc/QQB2-BWYQ].
295. See Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, supra note 290, at 918–19. 
296. See id. at 915. 
297. Dallas, Short-Termism, supra note 291, at 278–81; Dallas, The New Managerialism,
supra note 237, at 1380. 
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order to meet the numbers.298  They also manipulated their financial 
results and used off-sheet balance sheet transactions to obscure their true 
liabilities.299  One study found that myopic behavior by firms seeking to
meet quarterly earnings expectations had deleterious long-term effects on
firm performance.300  This study suggests, contrary to agency theory, that 
managers “caring too much” about stock prices harms shareholders in the 
long run.301 
Exemplifying these concerns was the famous “Numbers Game” Speech
given in 1998 by Arthur Levitt, then Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC).302  In this speech Levitt criticized the sophisticated 
methods managers were using to create false perceptions of their firms’ 
earnings that were contained in financial statements provided to their 
shareholders.303 Other SEC spokespersons lamented the need for a “cultural 
change” due to the willingness of firms to make misstatements in their financial
statements.304 A 1998 poll of CFOs found that 45% of CFOs reported that
their superiors had asked them to misstate their firm’s financial numbers
and 38% of them complied.305  Moreover, 78% of CFOs in the study reported
they had been asked to utilize accounting rules to create a more favorable 
impression of their firm’s financial information and 50% of them did so.306 
A more recent survey found that a “majority of CFOs admit to sacrificing 
long-term [firm] economic value to hit a target or to smooth short-term 
earnings.”307
 298. See Dallas, Short-Termism, supra note 291, at 279 (noting that this approach is referred
to as “real earnings management”). 
299. Id. at 278 (noting that this approach is referred to as “accounting earnings 
management”). 
300. See Natalie Mizik, The Theory and Practice of Myopic Management, 47 J.
MARKETING RES. 594, 595–96 (2010).  Contrary to the predictions of the efficient market 
hypothesis, firms benefit from myopic behavior in the short term because stock prices do
not reflect such behavior at the time it occurs.  See Dallas, Short-Termism, supra note 291, 
at 599. 
301. Dallas, Short-Termism, supra note 291, at 273. 
302. Arthur Levitt, former SEC Chairman, The “Numbers Game” at the New York 
University Center for Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt [https://perma.cc/TZ34-Q6UL].
303. Id.
 304. Stephen Barr, Misreporting Accounting Results, CFO MAG. (Dec. 1, 1998), http://
ww2.cfo.com/accounting-tax/1998/12/misreporting-results/ [https://perma.cc/U84Y-7EJD].
305. Id. (noting that a Business Week survey produced similar results).
306. Id. 
307. John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial 
Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 67 (2005); see also Ilia D. Dichev et al., Earnings
Quality: Evidence from the Field, 56 J. ACCT. & ECON 1, 1 (2013) (finding in survey of
CFOs of public companies that “in any given period, about 20% of firms manage earnings 
to misrepresent economic performance, and for such firms 10% of [earnings per share] is 
typically managed”).
532
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3. Executive Compensation 
As previously noted, managers have both business and personal reasons 
to enhance their firm’s stock prices.  Agency theory focuses on personal
reasons to encourage them to do so.308 As previously discussed, this theory 
essentially views managers as primarily motivated by their self-interest.309 
Therefore, it promotes managerial compensation that aligned their
compensation with the interests of the shareholders.310  Compensation
arrangements that apparently rewarded managers for growth under 
managerialism—with the profit motive as a constraint—were viewed as 
inferior to the shareholder value maximization conception that favored
pay-for-performance arrangements based on stock price improvements.311 
Stock options have become a favored form of compensation.312  While
stock options had been an important part of long-term equity compensation 
since the 1950s, firms’ use of stock options increased dramatically in the 
1990s and provided substantial compensation to executives in the rising
stock market of the 1990s.313  S&P data shows that almost 80% of median
CEO compensation from 1992 to 2000 was due to the growth in long-term 
equity incentives that consisted mainly of stock options.314  Stock-based
compensation was supported by the IRS’s exemption of performance-based
pay from the $1 million deductibility limit on executive compensation, 
added to the tax code in 1993.315  In addition, accounting rules at the time 
favored stock options because firms were not required to recognize the stock
 308. See supra text accompanying note 155.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 153, 155.  The impact of agency theory in the 
education of students in U.S. business schools was to change the objectives of managers from 
that of stewards or industrial statesmen to individuals seeking to maximize returns on 
discreet transactions.  See KHURANA, supra note 148, at 323, 325. 
310. See supra note 155. 
311. See Batt & Appelbaum, supra note 111, at 13–14 (discussing agency theory as 
encouraging pay-for-performance compensation arrangements and stock options); supra
text accompanying notes 151, 155. 
312. See Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, supra note 290, at 916. 
313. JOHN C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
62 (2006). 
314. CONFERENCE BD.,COMMISSION ON PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE:FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6 n.3 (2003) (reporting that options rose as a proportion of median
CEO compensation from 27% in 1992 to 60% in 2000). 
315.  26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (2012). 
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options as expenses on their financial statements when they were granted.316 
Firm earnings were inflated on financial statements for this reason and thus
misled shareholders as to the true value of their shares.317  Stock options
also gave managers the incentive to manipulate financial information due 
to legal rules that exempted options from short swing profit rules when
exercised.318  Also, structurally, stock options did not align the interests of
managers and shareholders, as ultimately acknowledged by agency theorists.319 
Because managers who held options won when the firm did well but they 
did not lose when the firm did poorly, they were motivated to make more 
risky decisions than preferred by diversified shareholders.320 
4. The Cognitive and Motivational Context 
for Managerial Decision Making 
The shareholder value maximization conception has contributed to the
cognitive and motivational context for managerial decision making in
encouraging unethical behavior.  While managers had always cared about
the stock price of their firms, they are now primarily evaluated on the basis
of their firm’s stock price.321  It is well known that unethical behavior increases
when compensation is based on outcome rather than the process—that is, 
the behavior undertaken in reaching an outcome.322  Firms are expected to 
316. Nicholas G. Apostolou & D. Larry Crumbley, Accounting for Stock Options:
Update on the Continuing Conflict, CPA J. (2005), http://archives.cpajournal.com/2005/
805/essentials/p30.htm [https://perma.cc/4SDG-P5XF].
317. Dallas, The New Managerialism, supra note 237, at 1379–80. 
318. The SEC changed it rules in 1991 to exempt trades of securities underlying options
from Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 if they were made six months after 
the options were granted, rather than six months after they were exercised. Ownership
Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Security Holders, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-28869, 56 Fed. Reg. 7242, 7242, 7250, 7256, 7271 (Feb. 21, 1991); see 
also Dobbin & Jung, supra note 155, at 40 (“Options created an incentive for executives 
to ‘manage’ earnings statements, inflating earnings when they were depressed and deflating 
when they were above expectations . . . .”).
319. See Claudia H. Deutsch, An Early Advocate of Stock Options Debunks Himself, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/03/business/yourmoney/an­
early-advocate-of-stock-options-debunks-himself.html?_r=0. 
320. An executive who exercises an option when the stock price goes above the option’s
exercise price obtains a benefit measured by the difference between the stock price and the
option’s exercise price.  If the stock price falls below the option’s exercise price, the executive
will not exercise the option and thus, he will not suffer a loss.  In contrast, the shareholder
who owns shares will benefit when the stock price goes up and will suffer a loss when the stock 
price goes down. See Dallas, The New Managerialism, supra note 237, at 1379; Dobbin &
Jung, supra note 155, at 37–38. 
321. See supra Section IV.A.3 & note 293; see also infra note 386. 
322. See Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations 
and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron’s 
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take actions necessary to boost their stock price when it appears that they
would not meet quarterly expectations.323 There are a number of actions
in the managers’ playbook to accomplish this purpose but they are often
short-term oriented and would not be undertaken in other circumstances.324 
Managers are also encouraged to look outward to the shareholders as 
their constituency.  Their high compensation is justified by comparing it
with often high stock prices.325  Consequently, internal disparities in 
compensation have increased dramatically.  From 1978 to 2012, CEO
compensation increased 875%, compared to 5.4% for the typical worker.326 
The CEO-employee pay ratio grew from 29.1% to 272.9% during this 
same period.327  The high compensation of CEOs and the disparities in
compensation have a number of consequences.
First, they have an impact on employee perceptions of the set of values 
considered as legitimate and moral within their firm.328  They send a
message that the primary purpose of the firm is to serve individual self­
interest.329 This is an egoism culture that is associated with unethical
behavior.330  It encourages actions that serve the self-interest of individual 
employees but do not serve the long-term interest of firms.  Moreover, 
even unethical cultures perpetuate themselves by determining the kinds of
individuals that the firm attracts, selects, retains, and promotes.331 
Second, high compensation and large disparities in compensation activates
a manager’s economic self-concept, making economics much more salient to
Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 34–35 (2003) [hereinafter Dallas, The Psychology of Enron’s 
Demise].
323. See supra Section IV.A.2.
 324. E.g., Levitt, supra note 302 (discussing the taking of “‘big bath’ restructuring 
charges, creative acquisition accounting, ‘cookie jar reserves,’ ‘immaterial’ misapplications of
accounting principles, and the premature recognition of reserves”). 
325. See Dallas, The New Managerialism, supra note 237, at 1365. 
326. Natalie Sabadish & Lawrence Mishel, CEO Pay in 2012 Was Extraordinarily 




 328. See Dallas, The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, supra note 322, at 36; Sreedhari
D. Desai et al., When Executives Rake In Millions: The Callous Treatment of Lower Level 
Employees 6–7 (July 21, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
329. Dallas, The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, supra note 322, at 36. 
330. See id. at 28–32, 36. 
331. Id. at 29 (quoting Benjamin Schneider, Work Climates: An Interactionist Perspective, 
in ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: DIRECTORS AND PERSPECTIVES 109, 119 (Nickolaus R. 
Feimer & E. Scott Geller eds., 1983)).
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him.332  This increases the likelihood that a manager will view employees 
as merely short-term means to an end.333  One study found that downsizing
of a firm’s workforce was more frequent when a significant portion of a 
CEO’s compensation consisted of stock options that encourage a focus on 
stock prices.334  High compensation fueled by stock options and large
disparities in compensation by symbolizing managerial status and power
create greater psychological distance between managers and lower-level 
employees and less sensitivity to social disapproval supporting unethical
behavior.335  One study found an association between high CEO compensation 
and the callous treatment of lower-level employees.336 The definition of
callous treatment in this study included significant workforce reductions, 
poor union relations, substantial penalties or controversies regarding employee 
health and safety standards, underfunded or inadequate retirement plans, and 
other employee relation controversies.337 
Third, high compensation and large disparities in compensation increases 
the likelihood of overconfidence on the part of CEOs.338  Overconfidence
results in inappropriate assessments of risk.  Moreover, it can lead to less 
managerial accountability when disparities in compensation lead employees
to curry favor with the CEO, or other higher level managers, in hopes of 
increasing their compensation.339  Managers receive less critical feedback 
from employees and therefore become less accountable in this politicized 
332. Id. at 36–37; see Black & Carbone, supra note 111, at 394–95 (noting that rather
than serving as stewards of their firms and being concerned with its wellbeing, the measure 
of success to CEOs became their bank accounts); Desai et al., supra note 328, at 6–7. 
333.  Desai et al., supra note 328, at 9.
 334. Jung, supra note 187, at 1360. 
335. Desai et al., supra note 328, at 7–8.  Increased power of the CEO is associated 
with more political behavior at firms, including “behind-the-scenes coalition formation,
office lobbying, cooptative attempts, withholding information, and the controlling of agendas.”
Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of Corporate Boards of Directors, 40 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 781, 817 (2003) (citing Kathleen M Eisenhardt & L.J. Bourgeois III, Politics of
Strategic Decision Making in High-Velocity Environments: Toward a Midrange Theory, 
31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 737, 749–53, 763–65 (1988)). 
336.  Desai et al., supra note 328, at 3–4. 
337. Id. at 11–12. 
338. Dallas, The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, supra note 322, at 37; see Mathew
L.A. Hayward & Donald C. Hambrick, Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large Acquisitions: 
Evidence of CEO Hubris, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 103, 114 (1997) (using the difference in pay
between the CEO and the second highest paid executive officer as a measurement of 
hubris); Troy A. Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Behavioral Corporate Finance, 
CEOs and Corporate Governance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 673, 717–19 (2005) (noting that 
large compensation packages and lavish perks give CEOs a sense of self-importance and 
contribute to their status and the deference given to them by others in the firm).
339. Dallas, The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, supra note 322, at 36–37. See also
supra note 335. 
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environment, which in turn feeds their overconfidence.340  This dynamic 
was at work at Enron prior to its downfall.341 
Fourth, egoism cultures experience difficulties creating covenantal
relationships as distinct from transactional relationships within firms.342 
Transactional relationships are instrumental relationships, often short-
term, in which parties engage in the economic exchange of skills and other 
resources.343  Covenantal relationships have a deeper connection, involving
mutual commitment, shared value, and produce citizenship behaviors that
promote the long-term interests of firms.344 
Finally, the strategies encouraged by the changing conceptions—from 
those of managerialism to shareholder value maximization—influenced 
managers’ strategies and their perceptions of firm employees.345  Scholars 
have explained that under managerial capitalism the business model was 
to seek “returns on investments derive[d] from the value created by productive
business enterprises,” whereas under finance capitalism “companies are 
viewed as assets to be bought and sold and as vehicles for maximizing profits
through financial strategies.”346  Under finance capitalism, workers are human 
assets and viewed the same way as any other asset.
In sum, a reason why the shareholder maximization conception is 
problematic is its contribution to the cognitive and motivational context 
it creates for firm decision making.  As practically implemented, it results
in firms that are prone to unethical and short-term behaviors.347
 340. Id. at 37. 
341. See generally id. at 35–55 (discussing the impact of employee compensation
disparities and overconfidence at Enron).  Jeffrey Skilling, Enron CEO, reportedly developed
during his tenure a “God syndrome.” Id. at 48–49 (citing Evan Thomas et al., Every Man 
for Himself, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 18, 2002, at 27–28). 
342. Tim Barnett & Elizabeth Schubert, Perceptions of the Ethical Work Climate 
and Covenantal Relationships, 36 J. BUS. ETHICS 279, 288 (2002). 
343. Id. at 280. 
344. Id. at 288 (citing Jill W. Graham & Dennis W. Organ, Commitment and the
Covenantal Organization, 5 J. MANAGERIAL ISSUES 483, 485 (1993); Linn Van Dyne et 
al., Organizational Citizenship Behavior: Construct Redefinition, Measurement, and Validation, 
37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 765, 768 (1994)). 
345. See supra Parts II–IV.
 346. PAUL KENNEDY, VAMPIRE CAPITALISM: FRACTURED SOCIETIES AND ALTERNATIVE 
FUTURES 79 (2017).
347. See KHURANA, supra note 148, at 324–26 (discussing changes in the education of
managers at business schools away from a notion of professionalism under managerialism 
to the legitimization of self-interested behaviors). 
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5. Short-Term Equity Traders 
An additional problem with the shareholder value maximization conception 
is that while putting the shareholders first, it did not properly differentiate 
among long-term and short-term shareholders and the increasing influence
of short-term shareholders.348 There is evidence that firms with a
predominance of short-term shareholders are more likely to engage in
unethical and short-term behaviors.  The predominance of short-term 
shareholders has been associated with the overvaluation of near-term 
earnings349 and earnings management.350  For example, it has been associated 
with abnormal accruals and the cutting of R&D expenses to meet quarterly 
earnings expectations.351  It has also been associated with financial misstatements
and weak internal controls352 as well as value-reducing acquisitions.353 
These associations have not been found for firms with a predominance of 
348. Institutional investors have been categorized as long-term and short-term shareholders. 
Dallas, Short-Termism, supra note 291, at 303–04. Long-term shareholders include two 
groups of investors: dedicated institutional investors—which invest in few firms and have 
a high percentage of shares held for two years, often over 75%—and quasi-indexer institutions—
which have diversified portfolios but trade infrequently.  Id. at 304.  These are both stable 
shareholders. Id.  Short-term shareholders—often referred to as transient institutional investors— 
have highly-diversified portfolios with often more than 70% of their stock turned over
within a quarter. Id. at 303–04. 
349. Id. at 304 (citing Brian J. Bushee, Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term 
Earnings Over Long-Run Values?, 18 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 207, 213 (2001)). 
350. Id. (citing Brian Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic 
R&D Investment Behavior, 73 ACCT. REV. 305, 307 (1998); Ping Sheng Koh, Institutional 
Investor Type, Earnings Management and Benchmark Beaters, 26 J. ACCT & PUB. POL’Y 
267, 269–70, 294–95 (2007); Dawn A. Matsumoto, Management’s Incentives To Avoid 
Negative Earnings Surprises, 77 ACCT. REV. 483, 487, 507, 511 (2002)).  One study finds 
that although short-termism may be fueled by pressure from transient shareholders, it is 
equally true that transient shareholders are attracted to companies that have executives with
short-term orientations and short-term cultures.  Francois Brochet et al., Short-Termism:
Don’t Blame Investors, HARV. BUS. REV., June 2012, at 28, 28.  Evidence is mixed on whether
short-term shareholders, variously defined, contribute to market efficiency.  See Lynne L.
Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting, 40 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 541, 561 n.68 (2016). 
351. Dallas, Short-Termism, supra note 291, at 304. 
352. Id. at 305 (citing Natasha Burns et al., Institutional Ownership and Monitoring:
Evidence from Financial Misreporting, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 443, 450, 453–54 (2010); Alex P.
Tang & Li Xu, Institutional Ownership and Internal Control Material Weakness, 49 Q.J.
FIN. & ACCT. 93, 95 (2010)).
353. Id. at 305 (finding that the predominance of short-term shareholders in firms 
has been correlated with an increased likelihood of takeovers but also overbidding transactions
and value-reducing acquisitions (citing José-Miguel Gaspar et al., Shareholder Investment 
Horizons and the Market for Corporate Control, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 135, 138 (2005))).  High
stock turnover in firms has also been associated with poorer firm investment decisions.  Dallas,
Short-termism, supra note 291, at 306 (citing Christopher Polk & Paola Sapienza, The Stock 
Market and Corporate Investment: A Test of Catering Theory, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 187, 188,
205 (2009)). 
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long-term investors.354  Therefore, the shareholder maximization conception 
falters in the context of financial markets that have increasingly come to
be dominated by the trading of short-term shareholders. 
6. Financial Scandals of the Early 2000s 
The negative consequences of the shareholder value maximization 
conception became very public with the corporate scandals in the early
2000s at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Adelphi and other firms.355  Enron and 
the other firms were large multi-layered subsidiary firms utilizing their 
vast networks to obscure their actual financial conditions.356  In fact, Enron 
was once a very highly regarded U.S. firm.  Fortune Magazine declared it 
to be the most innovative firm in the United States for six consecutive
years, but it was in reality a house of cards.357  Its culture was fixated on 
financial numbers and meeting or beating security analysts’ expectations.358 
The egoism culture within Enron led to unethical and short-term behavior 
on the part of its managers and resulted in the ultimate demise of the firm.359 
Outrage over these high-profile scandals that destroyed large firms caused
Congress to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to address pervasive 
accounting irregularities and fraudulent practices in U.S. firms.360  Many 
firms therefore began to restate their previously filed financial statements.
 354. See Dallas, Short-Termism, supra note 291, at 305 (citing Burns et al., supra note 
352, at 444). 
355. See generally Franklin R. Edwards, U.S. Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong
and Can It Be Fixed (2003) (unpublished manuscript), https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/mygsb/
faculty/research/pubfiles/1661/U.S.%20Corporate%20Governance%2010-05.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/NG56-6R2F] (discussing the failure of corporate governance mechanism to protect 
shareholders from the financial scandals of the early 2000s that involved massive financial 
misreporting and managerial self dealing).  A discussion of the savings and loan crisis and 
the dot-com bubble is beyond the scope of this Article. 
356. See John Boies & Harland Prechel, Capital Dependence, Business Political Behavior, 
and Change to the Multilayered Subsidiary Form, 49 SOC. PROBS. 301, 309–10 (2002). 
357. Howard Kurtz, The Enron Story That Waited To Be Told, WASH. POST (Jan. 18,
2002), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A64769-2002Jan17.html [https://
perma.cc/89HN-G4ZL].
358. See Dallas, The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, supra note 322, at 45, 49–50. 
Andrew Fastow, the CFO of Enron, is a notorious example of a CFO who engaged in the 
manipulation of financial numbers to enable his firm to meet earnings expectations.  See
Dobbin & Zorn, supra note 151, at 194 (citing Daniel Altman, The Taming of the Finance
Officers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/14/business/the­
taming-of-the-finance-officers.html). 
359. See Dallas, The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, supra note 322, at 45–51. 
360.  Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745. 
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For example, 83 NYSE listed firms restated their financial statements in 
1997, compared to 220 in the first six months of 2002.361 
Some scholars view the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as signaling 
the beginning of the end of an era of the imperial, charismatic CEOs
during the 1990s and early 2000s362 to be replaced by the “embattled CEOs”
of the twenty-first century who are more subject to regulation and oversight.363 
However, the embattled CEOs face even greater short-term pressures with 
short-term shareholders benefiting from changes that have enhanced shareholder 
power.364  Moreover, adherence to the shareholder value maximization
conception has not changed nor has pressure from short-term equity traders.
While most scholars would favor enhanced monitoring of firms by shareholders 
as a counterweight to managerial power, underlying this view was the implicit 
assumption that long-term shareholders—not short-term shareholders— 
would do the monitoring.365 
361. Harland Prechel & Theresa Morris, The Effects of Organizational and Political 
Embeddedness on Financial Malfeasance in the Largest U.S. Corporations: Dependence, 
Incentives, and Opportunities, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 331, 346 (2010) (noting additionally that 
“between 2002 and 2005 16[%] of the companies listed on the three major stock exchanges 
announced restatements” (citing Robert Tillman & Michael Indergaard, Control Overrides
in Financial Statement Fraud: A Report to the Institute for Fraud Prevention 1–2 (Jan. 16, 
2007) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/241868976_
Control_Overrides_in_Financial_Statement_Fraud)). 
362. See Cheffins, Corporate Governance, supra note 16, at 738 (quoting Joshua Chaffin,
Exit the Emperor-Bosses, Leaving a Legacy of Prudence, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 19, 
2005, at 11). See also supra text accompanying note 235.
363. See Cheffins, Corporate Governance, supra note 16, at 742; Coffee, Jr. & Palia, 
supra note 147, at 559–61 (noting that legal changes enabled shareholders to play a more 
active role in corporate governance); Kahan & Rock, supra note 147, at 998–1005, 1007– 
22, 1030–32, 1034–36 (2010) (discussing the loss of CEO power to boards of directors,
evidenced by increased CEO turnover rates, and the loss of CEO power to shareholders as 
a result of regulatory and other changes that support shareholder activism).  This period 
represents an evolution of shareholder activism with shareholders playing a more hands-
on role in corporate governance.  Cheffins, Corporate Governance, supra note 16, at 733– 
34 (stating that in contrast, “the 1990s institutional investors generally shied away from 
taking on a substantial hands-on corporate governance role” in favor of pressuring boards
of directors to exercise managerial oversight and adopt pay-for-performance arrangements 
for managers).
364. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 147, at 1007–36 (2010) (detailing changes in
governance rules, regulatory changes, board composition, and executive compensation). 
365. Note that the SEC has clearly stated that its primary focus as well is on the interests
of long-term investors rather than professional traders.  Concept Release on Equity Market
Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-61358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3603 (proposed Jan.
21, 2010). 
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7. Hedge Fund Activism 
Firm monitoring by hedge funds—who are short-term shareholders— 
has increasingly dominated the corporate landscape.366 Facilitated by the
shareholder value maximization conception, activist hedge funds seek to
influence firm decisions by threatening to engage, or engaging, in proxy
contests if their agendas are not followed.367  CEOs are indeed embattled 
by this activism.  Twenty percent of S&P 500 firms were the targets of 
hedge fund activism between 2009 and 2014.368  There were 1115 such
campaigns from 2010 to 2014.369  Hedge funds invest in few firms but have
holding periods of a year or less from their time of filing their Schedule 
13Ds.370 Managers of hedge funds are compensated based on 2% of the
assets under their management and 20% of the return on their fund’s
investments.371  They and their clients are willing to accept high risk for 
the potential of high returns.372  They target specific firms to achieve their 
goals.373  Their activism seeks firm changes that would cause a sharp rise 
in stock prices within a short period of time.  In essence, hedge funds seek
short-term arbitrage opportunities through their activism.374  They usually
focus on liquidity events, such as large one-time dividend payouts, stock 
repurchases, or the sale of some of the firm’s assets or the firm in its
entirety.375
 366. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 147, at 548. 
367. See id. at 553–56. 
368. Cheffins, Corporate Governance, supra note 16, at 742. 
369. Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 147, at 554 (citing Liz Hoffman & David Benoit, 
Activist Funds Dust Off Greenmail Playbook, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2014), at C1, https:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/activist-funds-dust-off-greenmail-playbook-1402527339 [https://
perma.cc/Q7JS-CWQG]).
370. Id. at 567. 
371. Id. at 573. 
372. Id.
 373. See id.
 374. See Dallas, Short-Termism, supra note 291, at 307. 
375. Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 147, at 572; Dallas, Short-Termism, supra note 
291, at 307. To facilitate policy changes in target firms, lead hedge funds typically acquire 
up to 10% of a target firm’s shares by the time they disclose their ownership of shares by
filing their Schedule 13D—required to be filed within the ten-day window after acquiring
5% of the target firm’s shares.  Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 147, at 562–63.  They are 
aided in their efforts to influence target management by other hedge funds—the “wolf 
pack”—that also acquire target firm shares before the lead hedge fund files its Schedule 
13D. Id. at 550–51.  Assuming the hedge funds acquire 33⅓% of the target firm’s shares 
and 15% to 20% of the shares are not voted at the meeting, which is typical, the hedge
funds only need to persuade the holders of 7% to 10% of the target firm’s shares to vote 
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Hedge funds benefit from their activism.376  Studies’ findings on the
consequences of this activism on target firms’ stock prices are mixed,377 
although it is clear that a significant number of target firms suffer long­
term negative consequences from it.378  Even if successful in opposing 
hedge funds’ insurgencies, targets of activism often feel pressure to adopt
the strategies proposed by the hedge funds.  For example, Pershing Square 
Capital Management (Pershing), a hedge fund, aligned with Valeant 
Pharmaceutical International (Valeant) in 2014 to control Allergan, Inc.
(Allergan).379  Valeant’s business model was to acquire pharmaceutical firms 
with established products, reduce their R&D programs, and maximize its 
profits by selling and developing already established products.380  Valeant
announced that if it was successful in taking over Allergan, it would decrease
Allergan’s R&D by 69%, focus its R&D on expanding the uses of Allergan’s
Botox products, and fire 20% of Allergan’s employees.381  When it became
apparent that the proxy contest for control of Allergan was likely to succeed, 
Allergan’s managers reacted by adopting the hedge funds’ objectives, although
on a smaller scale.382  This response by target firms is not atypical.  Over the
2009 to 2013 period hedge fund targets that were not taken over nevertheless 
decreased their R&D—as a percentage of sales—by more than 50%.383 
Firms not targeted by hedge fund activism are also affected by it because
they wish to avoid becoming a target.384  For example, after Allergan’s
experience, other pharmaceutical firms, in what has been referred to as a
trend, began to spin off non-core divisions and reexamined their R&D 
for their board nominees. Id. at 568.  Thus, short-term shareholders are able to obtain de 
facto control of major corporations “only to exit on average within a year after their 
appearance.” Id. at 604. Hedge fund activist campaigns have increased dramatically. See 
id. at 554–56. 
376. Wolf pack hedge funds actually incur very little risk by purchasing shares during the 
ten-day window and selling shortly thereafter, making millions in the process. Id. at 547, 565– 
66. 
377. See id. at 581–93 (providing an objective, comprehensive, and current analysis
of hedge fund studies); see also YVAN ALLAIRE & FRANÇOIS DAUPHIN, “ACTIVIST” HEDGE
FUNDS: CREATORS OF LASTING WEALTH? WHAT DO THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES REALLY SAY?
14 (July 2014), http://www.wlrk.com/docs/IGOPP_Article_Template2014_Activism_EN_
v6.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G8Y-5ELW] (providing a comprehensive discussion of hedge fund
studies, concluding that these studies “have not demonstrated that activist hedge funds, per se,
create lasting, long-term value”).
16% to 17% and cut its workforce by 13%). 
378. 
379. 
See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 147, at 584, 586. 
Id. at 577. 
380. Id. at 577–58. 
381. Id. at 578. 
382. See id. (reporting that Valeant decreased its R&D by 13% from its historical rate of
 383. Id. at 574. 
384. See id. at 579. 
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programs.385  The threat of hedge fund activism is ever-present and effective.
In 2014 hedge funds won 73% of their campaigns to acquire board seats,
and 44% of targeted firms’ CEOs were replaced within eighteen months.386 
Also, hedge funds do not just target “laggards,” as agency theorists would 
have predicted.387  For example, DuPont was the target of hedge fund activism
in 2015.388  It was highly successful and had been a profitable, innovative
firm for many years.389 Fortunately, long-term shareholders in this instance
pushed back.390  Nevertheless, DuPont sold off a major division, reorganized 
its R&D programs, and distributed $9 billion to its shareholders.391 
8. Large Payouts to Shareholders: A Change in
Orientation from “Retain and Reinvest” to  
“Downsize and Distribute”? 
Large payouts to shareholders in the form of dividends and stock repurchases
are often sought by hedge funds and also used by managers as a means to 
boost stock prices to impress the stock market.392  As previously mentioned,
agency theorists promoted payouts as a positive managerial disciplining 
tool and in furtherance of the shareholder value maximization conception.393 
Payouts are viewed as an investment-limiting strategy designed to discourage 
managers from engaging in self-interested empire building.394  By returning 
internally generated funds to shareholders, managers must persuade external
capital markets of the value of the investments they wish to make.  However,
payouts have some negative consequences.  A firm that must return to capital 
markets to fund investments involves transaction costs and introduces a level 
385. Id.
 386. Id. at 556. 
387. See id. at 582. 
388. See id. at 579. 
389. See id.
 390. Id. at 581 (naming BlackRock Inc., State Street Global Advisors, and the Vanguard 
Group as the supportive shareholders). 
391. Id. at 579. 
392. See William Lazonick, Profits Without Prosperity, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 2014), 
https://hbr.org/2014/09/profits-without-prosperity [https://perma.cc/Z648-FDL7].
393. See supra text accompanying note 155.
394. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 147, at 550. Compensation based on a firm’s 
size was believed to encourage managerial empire building.  However, managers are no longer
compensated on that basis. Dobbin & Zorn, supra note 151, at 183. 
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of uncertainty that may shorten the time horizon of firm investments.395 
Moreover, financing investments through debt, although requiring a serious
assessment by managers of whether the firm is likely to be able to pay off
the debt, introduces risk during economic downturns.396  This risk may 
discourage firm investments, particularly long-term investments, and also 
deprives firms of the ability to take advantages of business opportunities
that may arise in periods of economic down cycles.  In addition, some scholars 
claim that rather than disciplining managers, payouts to shareholders through 
stock buybacks have allowed managers to manipulate market prices to
enhance the value of their stock options that remain a significant portion
of managerial compensation.397 
Some scholars have argued that increasing payout to financial markets
through dividends, interest payments, and stock buyouts—in essence what 
they refer to as a change in policy from “retain and invest” to “downsize
and distribute”—are crowding out real investments by firms.398  While an 
in-depth review of this subject is outside the scope of this Article, there are 
some dramatic facts that raise serious concerns.  For example, one study
shows that from mid-2009 through 2013, firms borrowed nearly $900 billion,
invested only $400 billion, and paid out $740 billion to shareholders.399 
Another study shows that from 2003 to 2013 S&P 500 Index firms increased 
their spending on stock repurchases and dividends from 18% of operating
cash flow to 36% of operating cash flow and decreased their investments
on plant and equipment during this same period.400  The cuts in investments
were found to be more dramatic for targets of hedge fund activism.401
 395. Orhangazi, supra note 125, at 870, 881.  It is also problematic when managers are
not able to convey effectively to markets their private information about firm prospects. 
396. Dobbin & Jung, supra note 155, at 47. 
397. See, e.g., Paul Hribar et al., Stock Repurchases as an Earnings Management Device, 
41 J. ACCT. ECON. 3, 25 (2006); Lazonick & O’Sullivan, supra note 142, at 16. 
398. See, e.g., Orhangazi, supra note 125, at 866–68, 882–83. 
399. J.W. MASON, DISGORGE THE CASH: THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN BORROWING 
AND INVESTMENT 3 (Feb. 25, 2015), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/
Disgorge-the-Cash.pdf [https://perma.cc/64XB-R5KR].  “In the 1960s and 1970s, an additional 
dollar of earnings or borrowing was associated with about a [forty]-cent increase in investment. 
Since the 1980s, less than [ten] cents of each borrowed dollar is invested.” Id.
400. Vipal Monga et al., Firms Send More Cash Back to Shareholders, WALL ST. J.,
May 27, 2015, at A1; see also Lazonick & O’Sullivan, supra note 142, at 22–25 (noting 
the use of “retain and reinvest” strategies by firms in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s and increasing 
payouts by firms in subsequent decades); Maxwell Murphy, Bond-Funded Dividends, 
Buybacks Draw Skeptics, WALL ST. J. (June 16, 2015, 3:24 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/ 
2015/06/16/bond-funded-dividends-buybacks-draw-skeptics/ (discussing the practice of
firms in using debt proceeds on stock buybacks and dividends).  Total financial payments 
by firms as a percentage of profits before tax increased from the 1980s to 2003.  Orhangazi, 
supra note 125, at 867 fig.3. 
401. Monga et al., supra note 400.  It is possible that firms are simply making high 
profits due to technological advances, cost cutting strategies, and/or market power resulting 
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9. Financial Firms 
Managers of financial firms were responsible for the financial crisis by
failing to follow prudent financial practices as they sought short-term
profits, legitimated by the shareholder value maximization conception.402 
They did not adequately manage risk or consider the impact of their
actions on their clients or the long-term viability of their firms.403  Their
actions reverberated throughout the economy affecting firms, individuals, 
governmental bodies, and others.404 
A number of practices that contributed to the financial crisis continue
today and create an unstable, uncertain business environment.405  For instance, 
financial firms engage in “naked” derivative transactions.406 These transactions 
are not bona-fide hedging—insurance-like—transactions but are simply
bets or gambles.407  The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010—the “Dodd-Frank Act”—passed in the wake of the
financial crisis, arguably has not dealt adequately with this kind of derivative 
transaction.408 Naked derivatives are a source of profits for financial firms
from industry-concentration levels and have sufficient funds to cover their capital 
investments and R&D needs before returning large sums to shareholders.  It is also possible
that short-term financial players are squeezing every last penny out of firms, leaving them 
at risk in the long run.  Another change in the corporate landscape is that firms are not only 
more closely tied to financial markets because of their payouts to financial markets, but 
they may be more closely tied to financial markets because of their reliance on financial
markets for sources of income.  There is evidence of this during the 1980s and 90s.  Greta 
R. Krippner, The Financialization of the American Economy, 3 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 173, 
199 (2005). To the extent that firms increase their reliance on financial markets for sources
of income, financial markets become a matter of preoccupation at board meeting and non-
financial firms come to resemble financial firms as they become less dependent on productive
activities and place greater importance on financial markets. See Engelbert Stockhammer,
Financialisation and the Slowdown of Accumulation, 28 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 719, 719– 
20, 724, 738–39 (2004). 
402. See Dallas, Short-Termism, supra note 291, at 310–20. 
403. See id. at 278–81, 294–95. 
404. See id. at 290–93. 
405.  See id. at 286–87, 338. 
406. These transactions are sometimes referred to as “speculative” derivatives.  Id.
at 338. 
407. Id. at 286, 338; E. Glen Weyl & Eric A. Posner, A Proposal for Limiting Speculation 
on Derivatives: An FDA for Financial Innovation 1 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., 
Working Paper No. 594, 2012), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1012&context=law_and_economics. 
408. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); see 
Dallas, Short-Termism, supra note 291, at 338–40. 
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but create risks for non-financial firms and the financial system as a whole.409 
Ironically, these risks also provide profitable opportunities for financial
firms to sell financial products to non-financial firms to manage the risks 
the financial firms themselves have created. 
Financial firms continue to engage in unethical and illegal behavior.  An
example includes the actions of banks in rigging the LIBOR rate that
determines the cost of trillions of dollars of credit card debt, mortgages, and 
other loans. This behavior resulted in fines for banks and criminal convictions 
for bank traders in 2015 and 2016.410  Additionally, Citibank, JPMorgan Chase, 
Barclay, and the Royal Bank of Scotland, major financial institutions, were 
convicted of federal crimes in a scheme to manipulate the value of the
world’s currencies in 2015.411  These criminal actions increase risks facing 
non-financial firms that may affect their willingness to take risks by innovating 
and planning for the long term.  This behavior by financial firms suggests 
they have not given sufficient attention to changing their culture focused
on shareholder value maximization that contributed to the financial crisis.412 
Also, potentially troubling is that financial firms have become major players 
in commerce, thus not limiting their activities to finance.  Deregulation 
since the 1980s that culminated in the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act of 1999 
gradually allowed banks to enter global commodities markets.413  Moreover,
 409. Dallas, Short-Termism, supra note 291, at 286 (noting that by 2007, CDS contracts 
were worth twice as much as the nonprime mortgages outstanding). 
410. See James McBride, Understanding the Libor Scandal, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
REL. (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.cfr.org/united-kingdom/understanding-libor-scandal/p28729
[https://perma.cc/Z9EH-9SGM]; Margot Patrick & Josie Cox, Three Former Barclays Traders 
Convicted in Libor-Rigging Case, WALL ST. J. (July 4, 2016, 9:57 AM), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/three-former-barclays-traders-convicted-in-libor-rigging-case-1467640635; Randall 
Smith, Two Former Traders Found Guilty in Libor Manipulation Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/06/business/dealbook/two-former-traders-found-
guilty-in-libor-manipulation-case.html. 
411. Michael Corkery & Ben Protess, Rigging of Foreign Exchange Market Makes 
Felons of Top Banks, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/21/ 
business/dealbook/5-big-banks-to-pay-billions-and-plead-guilty-in-currency-and-interest- 
rate-cases.html?_r=0; Karen Freifeld et al., Global Banks Admit Guilt in Forex Probe,
Fined Nearly $6 Billion, REUTERS (May 20, 2015, 10:35 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
us-banks-forex-settlement-idUSKBN0O50CQ20150520 [https://perma.cc/TV5D-3DYJ].
412. See Dallas, Short-Termism, supra note 291, at 316–20. 
413. Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act), 
Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 15
U.S.C.); see Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and
Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 279–80, 285–88 (2013); Marcus Stanley, The Goldman 
Sachs Guide to Manipulating Commodities: How Big Wall Street Banks Are Gaming 
Commodities Markets, U.S. NEWS (July 24, 2013, 4:50 PM), https://www.usnews.com/ 
opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2013/07/24/how-goldman-sachs-and-wall-street­
manipulate-alumnimum-and-other-commodities; Reid B. Stevens & Jeffery Y. Zhang, 
Slipping Through the Cracks: Detecting Manipulation in Regional Commodity Markets 3
(Dec. 21, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2016/
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between 2002 and 2012, the Federal Reserve weakened the regulations of
bank holding companies by interpreting their ownership and trading of
physical commodities as “complementary” to their financial activities as 
commodity derivative traders.414  Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, bank
holding companies, have become “key players in the production, processing, 
transportation, storage, and trading of a wide range of physical commodities.”415 
This creates risks for non-financial firms in terms of access to vital products 
and the possibility of speculative trading that could raise the price of
products they need.416  It also creates unfair advantages to financial firms
over producers and other operators because of informational and financial
advantages they enjoy.417  Among other potential consequences, financial 
firms’ exposures in both financial and physical commodities markets may
also contribute to systemic risk of the financial system.418 
A situation that received a great deal of publicity involved non-financial 
firms’ access to raw materials.  It was claimed that Coca-Cola Company’s
ability to obtain aluminum cans for its soft drinks was affected by Goldman
Sachs’ practices in limiting the supply of aluminum from its subsidiary’s
warehouses.419  By way of background, since 1999 there has been an increase
in the trading of aluminum on financial markets and the amounts held by
financial firms.420 From 2010 to 2014, financial firms substantially increased 
their aluminum inventories, with one firm, Goldman Sachs, at one point 
holding over one-half of the total U.S. aluminum supply.421  The regional 
December/20161223/R-1547/R-1547_122216_131636_398498405419_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
LZH8-4VTA].
414. Omarova, supra note 413, at 288–89. 
415. Id. at 312–18, 318–24. 
416. See id. at 347–49. 
417. U.S. SENATE, PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 113TH CONG., WALL 
STREET BANK INVOLVEMENT WITH PHYSICAL COMMODITIES 34–36 (2014) [hereinafter
SENATE REPORT]; see Omarova, supra note 413, at 303, 341–46 (discussing, among other issues,
the informational advantages of financial firms and the substantial resources they possess, 
including the implicit governmental subsidy to bail them out, which allows them to obtain 
credit more cheaply from third parties than other firms); Stanley, supra note 413. 
418. SENATE REPORT, supra note 417, at 40–41; Omarova, supra note 413, at 271, 
344, 354–55. 
419. Stevens & Zhang, supra note 413, at 3; David Kocieniewski, A Shuffle of Aluminum, 
But to Banks, Pure Gold, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/
business/a-shuffle-of-aluminum-but-to-banks-pure-gold.html?pagewanted=all; Stanley, supra
note 413. 
420. Stevens & Zhang, supra note 413, at 4–5 & fig.2.
421. Id. at 3. 
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aluminum price rose during this period.422  A study of this period found the 
price increase was likely due to manipulation by Goldman Sachs in the aluminum
storage market, which was also the conclusion of a Senate report.423 The
study concluded that, “despite the regulatory framework introduced by the
[Dodd–Frank Act], regional physical commodity markets remain vulnerable
to manipulation.  Financial institutions like bank holding companies and 
hedge funds can manipulate regional markets and cause a large, sustained 
impact on regional prices.”424 In 2016, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System proposed stricter rules regarding bank holding companies’
holdings of physical commodities.425 
10. Inequality 
Lastly, the disparity of wealth in the United States has increased dramatically 
since the emergence of the shareholder value maximization conception of
corporate governance. Increases in stock prices disproportionately benefit
the wealthy.426 This is not surprising.  In terms of stock ownership, the
top 10% of the population owns 81% of the stock while the bottom 90% 
own only 19%.427  Thus, adopting the shareholder value goal means that
firms and their boards, executives, and employees should take all actions, 
within the bounds of the law, to benefit mainly 10% of the population.
The economic fallout on the remaining 90% is of less importance to firms 
422. Id. at 3, 4 fig.1.
423. SENATE REPORT, supra note 417, at 226; Stevens & Zhang, supra note 413, at 
7–9. 
424. Stevens & Zhang, supra note 413, at 42. 
425. See Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory Requirements for Activities of
Financial Holding Companies Related to Physical Commodities and Risk-Based Capital
Requirements for Merchant Banking Investments, Regulations Q and Y, 81 Fed. Reg.
67220, 67220 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 217 225).  The 
comment period on the proposed rules was extended to February 20, 2017.  Risk-Based Capital 
and Other Regulatory Requirements for Activities of Financial Holding Companies 
Related to Physical Commodities and Risk-Based Capital Requirements for Merchant
Banking Investments, Regulations Q and Y, 81 Fed. Reg. 94276, 94276 (Dec. 23, 2016). 
426. Michael T. Owyang & Hannah Shell, Talking Stock: Income Inequality and the 
Stock Market, ECON. SYNOPSES (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis, Mo.), Apr. 29, 
2016, at 1, https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publications/economic-synopses/2016­
04-29/taking-stock-income-inequality-and-the-stock-market.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BU2­
C9YM]; cf. Gomory & Sylla, supra note 115, at 113 (“[W]e have seen only small returns 
to most Americans over the last thirty years, the period in which the shareholder view
overtook the stakeholder view.  Almost all the gains from increased productivity . . . have
gone to the top economic tier.”).
427. Robert Frank, The Stock Gap: American Stock Holdings at 18-Year Low, CNBC 
(Sept. 8, 2014, 11:12 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/09/08/the-stock-gap-american­
stock-holdings-at-18-year-low.html [https://perma.cc/GX7D-UV8E]. 
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following the shareholder value maximization conception of corporate 
governance. 
Some scholars believe the shareholder value maximization conception
has shifted the strategic orientation of firms in such a way that they are
more likely to downsize by cutting the size of their workforces.428 They
seek to cut their costs, increase their profit margins, and meet the quarterly 
earnings expectations of security analysts.429  This is facilitated, among other
means, by a decline in the power of unions and technological changes that 
permit tasks to be performed with fewer workers.430  Moreover, the short­
termism of financial firms seeking to satisfy their investors contributed to 
the financial crisis that had an adverse impact on workers.  Significantly, 
one study found that the major cause of manufacturing job loss during the 
2007 to 2014 period was the financial crisis.431  A short-term focus is believed
by some to hinder the adoption of long-term business strategies by firms 
that would connect economic value creation with social value.432
 428. Batt & Appelbaum, supra note 111, at 18–20; Jung, supra note 187, at 1335–36; see
Lazonick & O’Sullivan, supra note 142, at 18–20; see also Davis, The Rise and Fall of Finance,
supra note 251, at 28 (“The orientation toward share price led corporations to restructure 
toward a flexible original equipment manufacturer (OEM) or network model of corporate 
organization . . . .”). 
429. See supra Sections III.C, IV.A.2. 
430.  Batt & Appelbaum, supra note 111, at 1, 20. 
431. Robert E. Scott, Manufacturing Job Loss: Trade, Not Productivity, Is the Culprit, 
ISSUE BRIEF (Econ. Pol’y Inst., Wash., D.C.) Aug. 11, 2015, at 2 & fig.A, 6, http://www.epi.org/ 
files/2015/ib402-manufacturing-job-loss.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9MV-ZN8W].  This study
also found that from 2000 to 2006 the major causes of the U.S. trade deficit were currency
manipulation and subsidies by foreign nations that contributed to the national trade deficit.
Id. at 7.  Currency manipulation enables foreign nations to suppress the value of their
currencies to make their industries’ products cheaper than U.S. products.  Subsidies also make
their products cheaper and thus increase foreign nations’ exports.  The U.S. steel industry
is currently under siege with having to compete with cheaper foreign products supported 
by currency manipulation and foreign subsidies. Thomas J. Gibson & Chuck Schmitt, The
Crisis Facing the U.S. Steel Industry, CNN (Mar. 23, 2016, 11:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2016/03/23/opinions/american-steel-industry-gibson-schmitt/ [https://perma.cc/YU5E-8SEE].
China has pursued mercantilist policies.  Gomory & Sylla, supra note 115, at 110–11.  There 
is “no economic theory [that] says that persisting in free trade is the best response to
mercantilism.”  Id. at 114. 
432. See Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value: How To Reinvent
Capitalism—And Unleash a Wave of Innovation and Growth, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb.
2011, at 1, 4, 8, https://ncg.org/sites/default/files/resources/HarvardBusinessReview_Creating_
Shared_Value.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NER-8CSF].
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The U.S. worker is faced today with a difficult job environment. The 
proportion of jobs that have low wages has increased because of outsourcing.433 
Outsourcing is designed to decrease the costs of the outsourcing firm, placing 
pressure on subcontractors to decrease their prices.  As a result, the
subcontractors’ employees may suffer decreased wages and benefits.434 
Vertical disintegration through global supply chains, that is, “offshoring,” 
also reduces the availability of jobs in the United States as primary firms 
vertically disintegrate, sending U.S. jobs to low-wage countries.435 
Additionally, the service sector has emerged as the largest source of U.S. 
jobs.436  The largest employers have changed from companies such as General 
Motors to companies like Wal-Mart.437  Lower wages and benefits often
accompany this change.438 Notably, many service jobs are eligible for offshoring 
to low-wage countries.439  Since the 1990s, this is true for high-skill jobs
as well as low-skilled jobs.440  Thus, the acquisition of a college degree or
greater skills does not necessarily guarantee a good job in the United States. 
While downsizing of employees was counter to developed norms in the
managerial era, it has become in the shareholder value maximization era 
“business-as-usual.”441 
Although cost cutting is ubiquitous in U.S. business decision making, 
decisions involving executive compensation have been the exception.442 
Executive compensation has increased dramatically.443  Firms’ practices have
changed with CEOs receiving high equity-based compensation to encourage 
them to maximize shareholder value.444  One study found that high CEO 
433. 
434. 
 Batt & Appelbaum, supra note 111, at 21. 
Id.
 435. Id.
 436. DEP’T FOR PROF’L EMPS., THE SERVICE SECTOR: PROJECTIONS AND CURRENT STATS
1 (2011), http://dpeaflcio.org/wp-content/uploads/Service-Sector-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
WT55-P75G]; see Davis, The Rise and Fall of Finance, supra note 251, at 28. 
437. Davis, The Rise and Fall of Finance, supra note 251, at 28, 29 tbl.1. 
438. Id. at 30–31.  Today’s largest employers also often provide limited opportunities for
career advancement. See id. at 30, 35.
 439. See id. at 39.
 440. See ALAN TONELSON, THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM: WHY A WORLDWIDE WORKER
SURPLUS AND UNCONTROLLED FREE TRADE ARE SINKING AMERICAN LIVING STANDARDS
99–100, 112–13, 115–16 (2000) (providing examples of high-end jobs being offshored); 
see Davis, The Rise and Fall of Finance, supra note 251, at 39 (stating that “any task that 
can be sent over the Internet” is vulnerable to offshoring).
441. Jung, supra note 187, at 1345. 
442. See Lawrence Mishel & Alyssa Davis, Top CEOs Make 300 Times More Than 
Typical Workers: Pay Growth Surpasses Stock Gains and Wage Growth of Top 0.1 Percent, 




 444. See supra Section IV.A.3.
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compensation contributed to inequality.445  Moreover, as previously discussed, 
high CEO compensation has been associated with the callous treatment of
employees.446 Also, downsizing is more frequent when a significant portion 
of CEO compensation consists of stock options, that is, when CEOs are 
more focused on stock prices.447 
Firm downsizing may have long-term negative consequences for the 
firms in U.S. markets.  For example, it may eventually have an impact on
U.S. consumer demand for products.448  While the decreasing share of firm
profits going to workers in past years has been offset to some degree by
consumer debt and workers, and their family members, working longer hours,
there are limits to these strategies for creating consumer demand.449  Also, 
as previously noted, consumer demand is not shored up by broad-based
substantial capital ownership by U.S. consumers.450 
Additionally, the weakened connections of firms with the wellbeing of
the communities in which they sell and produce their products will most 
likely have negative long-term firm consequences.451  Societal problems 
as well as firm externalities pose internal costs for firms.452  Firms rely on 
“public assets and supportive environments.”453 For example, important to
firms are healthy, educated workers; transportation facilities, such as ports,
roads and bridges; energy sources; raw materials that have not been depleted; 
and a broader business environment providing ancillary services to support 
their activities.454  They also rely on political systems to provide security for 
their workers and assets and provide them flexibility to operate.  Firms that 
do not consider as central to their business strategies the societal value they
create, and instead seek short-term profits, undermine their businesses
in the long run and also their legitimacy.455  Distrust of business is high in the
United States and it has generated considerable dissatisfaction.456  The plight
 445. See Jonathan L. Willis & Julie Wroblewski, What Happened to the Gains from 
Strong Productivity Growth?, 2007 FED. RES. BANK KAN. ECON. REV. 5, 20. 
446. See supra text accompanying note 336. 
447. See supra text accompanying note 334. 
448. See Business in America, supra note 278. 
449. It also increases the power of the U.S. financial sector, on which many people 
have become dependent. 
450. See supra text accompanying note 427. 
451. See Porter & Kramer, supra note 432, at 6. 
452. Id. at 5, 8. 
453. Id. at 6. 
454. Id. at 5, 12. 
455. Id. at 15–17. 
456. See id. at 4, 17.
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of U.S. workers may trigger political instability.  It has recently caused 
polarization among U.S. citizens, and the anger and dissatisfaction of U.S.
workers, as exhibited in the popularity of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump.457 
B. The Sustainability Conception of “Good” Corporate Governance 
There is considerable support for the emergence of a new conception of
corporate governance.458  The current conception has metamorphosed into 
a system that is increasingly under fire.459  It has been heavily criticized
and, some have argued, inconsistent with what agency theorists sought to
achieve.460  It has resulted in managers adopting short-term strategies to meet
the quarterly earnings expectation of security analysts and hedge fund
activists.461  Strategies such as excessive downsizing and cost cutting and 
large payouts to shareholders appear to pose threats to the long-term ability
of firms to contribute to human wellbeing.462  In addition, unethical and
illegal practices have become pervasive.463  The economy generally has been
 457. See James Surowiecki, Economic Populism at the Primaries, NEW YORKER (Feb. 
22, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/02/22/trump-sanders-and-the-american- 
worker [https://perma.cc/S7U4-5HSJ].
458. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC passim (2012)
(rejecting the firm goal of shareholder value maximization); Gomory & Sylla, supra note 
115, at 114–16 (discussing how the shareholder value maximization conception has misaligned
the interests of global corporations and the United States and proposing that profit maximization
be replaced with U.S. value-added maximization); Steve Denning, The Dumbest Ideas in 
the World: Maximizing Shareholder Value, FORBES (Nov. 28, 2011, 1:19 PM), https:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2011/11/28/maximizing-shareholder-value-the-dumbest-
idea-in-the-world/2/#71a76601e387 (arguing for a focus on consumers and an abandonment of
the shareholder expectation model that rewards gaming the financial system rather than creating 
real value); see also Dallas & Barry, supra note 350, at 544–45 nn.3–5 (referencing numerous
research reports, policy statements, recommendations, and scholarly articles expressing concern 
about short-termism and the fixation of managers on meeting analysts’ earnings projections).
459. See generally Gomory & Sylla, supra note 115 (questioning whether the shift 
to shareholder value maximization has been beneficial to the United States); Michael
Magill et al., A Critique of Shareholder Value Maximization 37 (Swiss Fin. Inst., Research
Paper No. 13-16, Mar. 26, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2246797 (providing a model 
showing that large firms that engage in profit maximization underinvest and that they must
take into account the “external effects” of their decisions “on consumers and workers . . . 
to achieve a Pareto optimal outcome”); Denning, supra note 458 (criticizing managerial 
incentives to focus on stock market prices).
460. See Dobbin & Jung, supra note 155, at 30–31; Denning, supra note 458; Michael
C. Jensen, Value Maximization and Stakeholder Theory, HARV.BUS.SCH.WORKING KNOWLEDGE
(July 24, 2000), http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/value-maximization-and-stakeholder-theory
[https://perma.cc/US47-724L] (arguing in favor of enlightened stakeholder theory, which
rejects prioritizing shareholder interests in favor of maximizing total long-term firm value). 
461. See supra Sections IV.A.2.7.
 462. See supra Sections IV.A.8–9. 
463. See supra Section IV.A.2.4.6.9.
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harmed by the increased risks of such behaviors that were realized in such
disasters as the corporate scandals of the early 2000s and the financial crisis
of 2007 to 2009.464  Additionally, financial firms have increased the risks
of nonfinancial firms by engaging in opportunistic behaviors and
speculative trading in derivatives, currency markets, and physical commodities, 
all legitimated by maximizing profits for their shareholders.465 These behaviors
have arguably severed the relationship between profits and social value. 
In this connection a sustainability conception of corporate governance 
has gained considerable traction in recent years among scholars, investors,
and business leaders.466  This sustainability conception encourages firms 
to pursue long-term value and focus on the interests of their stakeholders.467 
It is more consistent with effective corporate governance from a societal 
perspective than the shareholder value maximization conception.  It is based 
on the recognition that firms affect many people, not just shareholders.468 
While this view is critical of the shareholder value maximization conception,
long-term shareholders are expected in most cases to benefit from the 
464. See supra Sections IV.A.6.9.
 465. See supra Section IV.A.7.9.
 466. See, e.g., Dominic Barton et al., Re-Imagining Capitalism for the Long Term:
Situating the Volume, in RE-IMAGINING CAPITALISM 1, 11 (Dominic Barton et al. eds., 
2016) (reimaging capitalism “as evolving from a narrowly defined shareholder capitalism 
to a focus on long-term value creation and prioritization of a broader set of stakeholders”); 
Robert G. Eccles et al., The Impact of Corporate Sustainability on Organizational Processes 
and Performance, 60 MGMT. SCI. 2835, 2853 (2014) (finding “during the 18-year period 
[studied], high sustainability companies outperform the low sustainability ones in terms of 
both stock market and accounting measures while the market did not actually expect the 
outperformance”); David Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 523, 530–33 (2011) [hereinafter Millon, Two Models of Corporate
Social Responsibility] (noting that his sustainability model views stakeholder concerns as 
“essential to the viability and success of the firm” and shareholder value); Judd F. Sneirson, The 
Sustainable Corporation and Shareholder Profits, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 541, 543 
(2011) (“A sustainable business should . . . pursue financial goals while at the same time treading 
as lightly as possible on the earth and its natural resources, supporting the business’s employees 
and local communities, and developing products, services, and technologies that contribute to
larger societal efforts to live more sustainability.”); see infra text accompanying note 513. 
467. See Eccles et al., supra note 466, at 2843–45.  This Article conflates the constituency
and sustainability models discussed by Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 
supra note 466, at 524–25.  Thus, this Article does not adopt the sustainability model as proposed
by Millon. See infra text accompanying notes 490–504 (discussing the importance of stakeholder 
rights and engagement); see also note 479 (discussing the importance of business environment 
to conceptions of corporate governance). 
468. Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, supra note 290, at 919–20. 
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sustainability conception.469  That is, the wellbeing of firms in the long
term depends to a large degree on the wellbeing of all stakeholders.470  While 
study findings are mixed, one recent study—distinguished by measuring 
the financial performance of firms over a long period of time—found that
high-sustainability companies outperformed their low-sustainability
counterparts in both stock and accounting returns.471  High sustainability
firms have a “culture of sustainability” and adopt policies and practices 
attending to the needs of the environment, employees, customers, suppliers, 
and other stakeholders.472  Other studies have also demonstrated the profitability 
of sustainable businesses.473 The shared value perspective endorses the 
sustainability view and encourages firms to “creat[e] [economic] value in
a way that also creates value for society by addressing its needs and 
challenges.”474  This requires firms to integrate into the core of their strategic
decision making the interests of stakeholders.475 
Contrary to the views of some, there are no corporate law impediments
to firms adopting the sustainability conception of corporate governance.476 
Courts grant corporate boards of directors substantial discretion under the 
business judgment rule in making business decisions on behalf of their
firms.477  Moreover, corporate law regarding corporate purpose has not
materially changed over the years.478  Note that in the past under managerialism
U.S. firms did not operate in accordance with the shareholder value
maximization conception.479
 469. Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, supra note 466, at
530–33. While the sustainability conception proposed in this Article often coincides with 
seeking long-term shareholder value, it is measured by a positive long-term relationship 
between firm behavior and social value. 




 Eccles et al., supra note 466, at 2850–51. 




Sneirson, supra note 466, at 543 n.10. 
 Porter & Kramer, supra note 432, at 4.
Id. (criticizing the “‘social responsibility’ mind-set” of some firms that view “societal
 476. See, e.g., STOUT, supra note 458, at 10; Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate 
Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 10–15 (2014).  The Revlon Doctrine is an arguable 
exception in the context of sale of control transactions, although recent case law has weakened
this exception. See Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, 71 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 167, 193–95 (2014) [hereinafter Johnson & Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon]. 
477. See 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 cmt. d (1994). 
478. The only significant change has been the Revlon Doctrine that has been substantially
weakened.  See Johnson & Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, supra note 476, passim. 
479. See supra text accompanying notes 110–18.  The sustainability conception has some
features in common with managerial capitalism, where profit was one firm goal among others. 
See supra text accompanying note 13.  However, the “countervailing” forces that operated
under managerialism do not operate today.  Gomory & Sylla, supra note 115, at 108.  During
554
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There is reason for optimism because businesses can be seen to adopt 
the sustainability conception of good corporate governance through some 
of their policies.  Firms, for example, have acknowledged the importance 
of corporate social responsibility (CSR) by adopting internal codes of 
conduct.480  Moreover, many firms voluntarily provide sustainability reports
that disclose their CSR practices, with a majority of these reports being 
certified by third parties.481  GM provided the first public CSR report 
in 1972.482  By 2013, 93% of Fortune Global 250 firms provided CSR 
reports, of which 59% were independently verified.483  Also, a number of
companies have become B Corporations.484  These corporations are required
to meet certain performance standards relating to governance, workers,
community, and the environment.485  New corporate forms have also emerged,
the earlier period, shareholders were mainly passive, and many employees had unions
to represent them.  Id. at 116.  Today, shareholders have a great deal of power, and unions 
have very little power.  Id. at 108.  Without the creation of countervailing power favoring
employees and other stakeholders, it is unlikely that the sustainability conception will
operate as intended in practice.  This is why various methods to give more weight to employee 
interests are discussed in this Part. See infra text accompanying notes 490–504.  Moreover, it
is important to point out that there has been a learning process in response to a changing 
business and technological environment that will influence firms—that pursue profit among
other goals—to adopt different business structures and strategies than in the past. 
480. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20803, CODES OF CONDUCT FOR
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS: AN OVERVIEW 6–7 (2013), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2115&context=key_workplace. 
481. KPMG INT’L, KPMG INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 
REPORTING 2013, at 22, 33 (2013), https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2015/
08/kpmg-survey-of-corporate-responsibility-reporting-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MZL­
PRKC] (referring to third-party certification as “external assurance”); Davis et al., Political 
Agency, supra note 246, at 104, 112–13; Sneirson, supra note 466, at 558 n.81.  “Triple-bottom
line” reporting focuses on people, planet, and profit consistent with the Global Reporting
Initiative Sustainability Reporting Guidelines.  Suntae Kim et al., Why Companies Are Becoming 
B Corporations, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 17, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/06/why-companies- 
are-becoming-b-corporations [https://perma.cc/T4CG-MJCW]; see GLOB.REPORTING INITIATIVE,
G4 SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING GUIDELINES 3 (2016), https://www.globalreporting.org/
resourcelibrary/GRIG4-Part1-Reporting-Principles-and-Standard-Disclosures.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5RVW-XE9U].  See generally GLOB.REPORTINGINITIATIVE,THEEXTERNALASSURANCE 
OF SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING (2013), https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/
GRI-Assurance.pdf [https://perma.cc/NU2U-QCKJ].
482. David Malone & Robin W. Roberts, Public Interest Reports as a Medium for 
Corporate Disclosure: The Case of General Motors, 15 J. BUS. ETHICS 759, 760 (1996);
Davis et al., Political Agency, supra note 246, at 112. 
483. KPMG INT’L, supra note 481, at 12, 22.
484. Kim et al., supra note 481. 
485. Id.
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such as benefit corporations and flexible purpose corporations that require 
firms to serve general or special public benefits.486  A trend in the direction 
of corporate social responsibility is also seen with young entrepreneurs,
such as the founders of Kickstarter who decided to forego selling out their 
firm for large sums in favor of operating their business in a hybrid form
that takes into account public benefits.487  Reflecting the importance of
sustainability is the Dow Jones Sustainability Index that assesses firm 
policies and practices that contribute to sustainability.488 
There are a number of steps that can be taken to further the sustainability
conception. Coordinating the steps and determining priorities requires focused
efforts by business leaders, scholars, politicians, and others, exemplified
by such groups as the Aspen Institute and FCLT Global.489  One step is to 
486. See  WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR. ET AL., BENEFIT CORP., WHITE PAPER: THE NEED
AND RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST
ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE
PUBLIC 1, 16, App. C 5–6 (Jan. 18, 2013), http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Benefit_
Corporation_White_Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/FPM8-QMQP]; Ian Kanig, Note, Sustainable
Capitalism Through the Benefit Corporation: Enforcing the Procedural Duty of Consideration 
to Protect Non-Shareholder Interests, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 863, 890–92 (2013); Ellen Berrey,
How Many Benefit Corporations Are There? 1 (May 5, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2602781. See generally Lyman Johnson, 
Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 
269 (2013) (providing a thoughtful analysis of benefit corporations in the context of corporate
law doctrine and theory).  Professor Davis has suggested other forms of businesses, such
as cooperatives and mutuals.  Davis, supra note 191, at 136–37. 
487. Mike Isaac & David Gelles, Kickstarter Focuses Its Mission on Altruism over 
Profit, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/technology/kick 
starters-altruistic-vision-profits-as-the-means-not-the-mission.html?_r=0. 
488. ROBECOSAM, MEASURING INTANGIBLES: ROBECOSAM’S CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY
ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 13 (2017), http://www.robecosam.com/images/Measuring_
Intangibles_CSA_methodology.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9E7-BBFF]. 
489. See ASPEN INST., AMERICAN PROSPERITY PROJECT: A NONPARTISAN FRAMEWORK 
FOR LONG-TERM INVESTMENT 2, 4 (2016), https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/
2017/01/American-Prosperity-Project_Policy-Framework_FINAL-1.3.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VT26-5R8Z]; DOMINIC BARTON ET AL., FCLT GLOB., RISING TO THE CHALLENGE OF
SHORT-TERMISM 1, 11–12 (2016), http://www.fcltglobal.org/docs/default-source/default­
document-library/fclt-global-rising-to-the-challenge.pdf?sfvrsn=0 [https://perma.cc/MXE9­
7GMD]; Rebecca Darr & Tim Koller, How To Build an Alliance Against Corporate Short-
Termism, MCKINSEY & CO. (Jan. 2017), http://www.mckinsey.com/Business-Functions/
Strategy-and-Corporate-Finance/Our-Insights/How-to-build-an-alliance-against-corporate­
short-termism [https://perma.cc/BFL2-2NN3]; see also JOHN KAY, U.K. DEP’T FOR BUS.
INNOVATION & SKILLS, THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG-TERM DECISION
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mandate social disclosures and require independent certification of them.490 
Requiring these disclosures is a powerful tool.  For example, one study
found that firms that did not voluntarily disclose the number of workers
they employed by geographical segment were firms that were offshoring 
jobs and therefore anticipated worker and public backlash if they disclosed
that information.491  Moreover, having firms disclose information of relevance
to employees, such as the percentage of employees covered by their pension 
plans and the amounts firms contribute to them on their employees’ behalf, 
would enhance the likelihood that firms would take employee interests 
more into account.492 Professor Norman Bowie some years ago set out 
instructions for ethical decision making by firms: (1) “consider the interests
of all stakeholders in making decisions,” (2) get actual “input from all affected
stakeholders,” (3) do not give one stakeholder absolute priority for all 
decisions, as is the case for shareholder value maximization, and (4) establish 
just procedures for accomplishing these requirements.493  Firms are encouraged 
to take into account the interests of all stakeholders in making decisions 
when social disclosures are mandated.494 
Rarely do corporate scholars argue that shareholders are owners of 
firms, although this term is often used in the popular press and in court 
decisions. For example, in analyzing eleven tests of ownership, only two
tests were unequivocally met by shareholders of firms.495  Moreover, while it
has been argued under the residual rights theory that only shareholders
 490. See supra text accompanying note 483.  See generally Dallas, Short-Termism, supra
note 291, at 324–35 (reexamining disclosures to take into account the long-term value of 
firms).
491. Anne Beatty & Scott Liao, What Do Multinationals’ Disclosure of the Number 
of U.S. Versus Foreign Employees Tell Us? 3–5, 10 (Mar. 19, 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/rtfiles/accounting/ANNE.BEATTY.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2PBE-6YCQ]. 
492. See Jacoby, supra note 115, at 485–86. 
493. Norman E. Bowie, The Firm as a Moral Community, in MORALITY, RATIONALITY,
AND EFFICIENCY: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIO-ECONOMICS 169, 176 (Richard M. Coughlin 
ed., 1991).
494. The federal securities laws were based on the philosophy of Justice D. Brandeis, 
who stated, “Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. 
Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”
Justice Louis D. Brandeis, BRANDEIS UNIV., http://www.brandeis.edu/legacyfund/bio.html
[https://perma.cc/8FH4-GYEB]. 
495. John Kay & Aubrey Silberston, Corporate Governance, in 2 PERSPECTIVES ON
COMPANY LAW 49, 53–55 (Fiona Macmillan Patfield ed., 1997) (discussing A.M. Honoré, 
Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 113, 116–21, 123, 126 (A.G. Guest
ed., 1961)).
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have residual interests in firms, employees also have residual rights and 
are more concerned with the survival of their firms than diversified 
shareholders.496  There is therefore theoretical support for Professor Bowie’s
requirements for ethical decision making that involve getting input from 
affected stakeholders and establishing just procedures for doing so.
Some strategies proposed or adopted in other developed nations potentially 
go further than Professor Bowie’s prescriptions by providing for participation 
by stakeholders in firm decision making, although some strategies are limited 
to allowing stakeholders to provide input. Some scholars and politicians have 
proposed having employees on corporate boards, employee committees, or 
some other method for employee engagement.497  This is commonplace in
Germany, which has a system of employee co-determination that includes
employee representatives on the supervisory board and internal firm works
councils.498  Moreover, many European nations have works councils
that institutionalize communications among managers and employee 
representatives.499  These ethical firm decision making mechanisms provide
some countervailing balance to the unrestrained influence of shareholders 
within firms present in the current era and therefore make more likely the
realization of the objectives of the sustainability conception.500 
However, a sustainability approach does not require changes in governance 
structures or new forms of businesses.  Firms may adopt stakeholder
engagement practices that facilitate managers’ understanding of the interests 
of stakeholders.501  They may make investments in managing stakeholder
relationships and integrate sustainability concerns into managerial and 
496. See Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 
283, 305, 308–09 (1998). 
497. UK DEPT. FOR BUS., ENERGY & INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
REFORM –GREEN PAPER 38–42, Nov. 2016 (exploring options for reform to strengthen the 
voice of stakeholders in large UK firms); Jacoby, supra note 115, at486; Marleen A. O’Connor,
The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law To Facilitate Labor-Management
Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 962–63 (1993); see Dallas, Two Models of Corporate 
Governance, supra note 12, at 109–13. 
498. Bennet Berger & Elena Vaccarino, Codetermination in Germany – A Role Model
for the UK and the US?, BRUEGEL BLOG (Oct. 12, 2016), http://bruegel.org/2016/10/ 
codetermination-in-germany-a-role-model-for-the-uk-and-the-us/; see also Lynne L. Dallas, 
Proposals for Reform of Corporate Boards of Directors: The Dual Board and Board
Ombudsperson, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91, 96 n.8 (1997) [hereinafter Dallas, The Dual 
Board] (proposing a dual board structure in the United States different from the dual board
structure in Germany).
499. See Employee Involvement – European Works Councils, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=707&langId=en&intPageId=211 [https://perma.cc/
6G29-2XZL] (providing information on works councils in the European Union).
500. See Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, supra note 290, at 919–20. See 
generally ROBERT REICH, SAVING CAPITALISM: FOR THE MANY, NOT THE FEW 167–92 (2015) 
(discussing the decline of countervailing power and measures to restore it).
501.  Eccles et al., supra note 466, at 2840. 
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lower-level decision-making, including making sustainability concerns
relevant to compensation determinations.502  Firms become more successful 
in achieving sustainability objectives when the board and top executives 
value and take responsibility for the implementation of their firm’s 
sustainability policies and practices.503 Feedback from stakeholders and an
interested public are encouraged by firm disclosures of their sustainability
policies and practices.504 
The main criticism of a sustainability approach is that it is believed to 
give managers too much flexibility in making business decisions.505  They
may pursue their own self-interest under the guise of serving selected
stakeholder interests.  Without the single goal of shareholder wealth
maximization, they are believed to become unaccountable.  However, directors 
already have broad discretion under the business judgment rule, and the
goal of shareholder value is sufficiently ambiguous to encompass most 
business decisions.506  Moreover, persons often become more accountable
by pursuing multiple objectives, depending on our normative premises of
what we would like them to achieve.  For example, professors have goals
of excellence in teaching, scholarship, and service.  There are conflicts among 
these goals and they must make tradeoffs among them.  However, professors
are no less accountable because of them.507  Also, consider the importance 
of multiple goals in the following situation.  A mother has three children.
Would we say she should maximize the welfare of one of her three children?
In fact, we would say that she would be irresponsible and acting unfairly 
to pursue one goal in these circumstances in which her children, who possess 
conflicting interests, rely on her decision making. The issue is not feasibility
or accountability, but our normative premises.  Thus, the main issue of corporate
governance is whether the firm is effective, that is, the degree to which it 
is successful in reaching desired results.
As this Article has shown, the shareholder value maximization conception
has contributed to short-term behaviors by managers.508  This behavior is
inconsistent with the sustainability conception of corporate governance. 
502. Id. at 2836, 2839, 2841. 
503. Id. at 2839. 
504. Id. at 2841. 
505. LYNNE L. DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: A SOCIOECONOMIC APPROACH 518
(2005) [hereinafter DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY]; KHURANA, supra note 148, at 321. 
506. DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 505, at 519. 
507. Id. at 518. 
508. See Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, supra note 290, at 911–12. 
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It is detrimental to workers, long-term shareholders, and society in general.
Destroying the environment, excessive firing of employees, and producing 
defective products may increase firm profits in the short term, but they do 
not enhance human wellbeing in the long-term.509  A recent study utilizing 
financial measures of short-termism found that short-termism negatively
impacted long-term shareholders.510  It found U.S. firms that manage more
for the long-term than their peers substantially outperformed them and 
provided more jobs.511  Estimations from this data suggest that if all U.S.
public firms performed similarly, five million additional jobs would have
been created from 2001 to 2015, and the U.S. GDP would have increased by
$1 trillion.512 Numerous business and financial leaders, business commentators, 
academics, and politicians are in agreement on the problematic nature of 
short-term firm decision making.513  They have expressed their concern 
that firms are not operating to enhance long-term performance and that this
is detrimental to society.514  These include such luminaries as Hillary Clinton, 
Joe Biden, and Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, the world’s largest
institutional investment firm.515 
In addition to the steps mentioned above concerning social disclosures 
and employee engagement, a number of other steps can be taken to support 
509. See id. at 911–12, 915, 924–25. 
510. Dominic Barton et al., Finally, Evidence That Managing for the Long Term 
Pays Off, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 9, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/02/finally-proof-that­
managing-for-the-long-term-pays-off [https://perma.cc/4Q58-YRZ3].
511. Id.  A long-term perspective also facilitates a stakeholder approach because in
the short term, tradeoffs are made among the interests of stakeholders.  Eccles et al., supra
note 466, at 2841–42; see also Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, supra note 290, 
at 911–12, 927 (discussing how short-termism is an “impediment” to corporate social responsibility).
512.  Barton et al., supra note 510. 
513. Dallas & Barry, supra note 350, at 544–45.  “Short-termism is the subject of important 
research reports, policy statements, and recommendations from the business community.”
Dallas, Short-Termism, supra note 291, at 269.  See also HOUSE OF COMMONS, BUS. INNOVATION
& SKILLS COMM., THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND LONG-TERM DECISION 
MAKING: THIRD REPORT OF SESSION 2013–14 (2013), https://publications.parliament.uk/ 
pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmbis/603/603.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QA4-XSRF] (reporting on
short-termism in UK equity markets and making proposals for reform). 
514. Id.
 515. Joe Biden, How Short-Termism Saps the Economy: Paying CEOs So Much in 
Stocks Puts Their Focus on the Share Price Instead of Building for the Long Run, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 27, 2016, 7:14 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-short-termism-saps­
the-economy-1475018087; William A. Galston, Clinton Gets It Right on Short-Termism:
Too Many CEOs Ignore Long-Term Performance, to the Economy’s Harm, WALL ST.
J. (July 29, 2015, 8:41 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hillary-gets-it-right-on-short­
termism-1438124913; Matt Turner, Here Is the Letter the World’s Largest Investor, BlackRock
CEO Larry Fink, Just Sent to CEOs Everywhere, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 2, 2016, 8:03 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/blackrock-ceo-larry-fink-letter-to-sp-500-ceos-2016-2. 
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the sustainability conception.516  There is evidence that managers can attract 
long-term shareholders to their firms by adopting sustainability policies.517 
Long-term investments by shareholders can also be encouraged by such 
methods as imposing a securities transaction tax and increasing capital
gains taxes for short-term stock turnovers.518  Additionally, mutual funds may 
be required to include trading costs in the expense ratio disclosed to their 
clients.519 In one fund, for example, the reported expense ratio was 1.94%,
but had trading costs been included, it would have been 5.55%.520 The
compensation of fund managers can also be based on long-term results 
rather than on quarterly earnings, referred to as the “quarter sprint.”521 
This may occur as mutual fund investors become less inclined to redeem
their funds on the basis of short-term results because they become aware 
of the trading costs associated with their redemptions.  Additionally, efforts
can be made to encourage the Securities and Exchange Commission to support
the development of the long-term stock exchange proposed to benefit 
Silicon Valley firms.522 
To diminish hedge fund activism, a number of measures have been
recommended to limit the ability of hedge fund groups—“wolf packs”— 
to engage in short-term activism.523  A more aggressive suggestion than 
516. Some concerted efforts have been made to evaluate and propose steps that should
be taken. See, e.g., ASPEN INST., supra note 489. 
517. Eccles et al., supra note 466, at 2842 (finding that high sustainability companies
are significantly more likely to attract long-term shareholders).  One study finds that although
short-termism may be fueled by pressure from transient shareholders, it is equally true that
they are attracted to companies that have executives with short-term orientations and short-
term cultures.  Brochet et al., supra note 350, at 28 (finding that short-term shareholders 
are attracted to firms with short-term orientations and short-term cultures). 
518. Dallas, Short-Termism, supra note 291, at 348–50; Jacoby, supra note 115, at 484. 
519. Dallas, Short-Termism, supra note 291, at 329–30; see Jeff Schwartz, Reconceptualizing
Investment Management Regulation, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 521, 546–47 (2009). 
520. Henry T.C. Hu, The New Portfolio Society, SEC Mutual Fund Disclosure, and
the Public Corporation Model, 60 BUS. LAW. 1303, 1326 (2005). 
521. Dallas, Short-Termism, supra note 291, at 319. 
522. See Ellen Huet & Brad Stone, Silicon Valley’s Audacious Plan To Create a New 
Stock Exchange, BLOOMBERG (June 12, 2016, 4:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2016-06-12/silicon-valley-s-audacious-plan-to-create-a-new-stock-exchange [https://perma.cc/
26SG-KRCY].
523. See Coffee, Jr. & Palia, supra note 147, at 595–601 (making recommendations such 
as to decrease the ten-day window that delays the disclosure of target share acquisitions
by hedge funds, to modify insider-trading regulations to cover tips by the lead hedge fund 
to wolf pack members, and to provide an expanded definition of “group” to include wolf 
pack members).
 561







   






   






















these measures is to prohibit short-term shareholders from engaging in
proxy contests.524  Another is to require that activists own a 3% interest in
the target for two years after substantially successful activist interventions.  A
less aggressive suggestion would apply certain provisions of firm proxy 
access bylaws to all campaigns for board seats.  For example, typically,
bylaw proxy access is limited to shareholders who have held 3% of the
firm’s shares for three years prior to their proposing director nominees.525 
High penalties and serious enforcement would aid in assuring compliance
with these measures.
Other suggestions involve the use of time-phased voting stock, stock 
that receives greater amounts of dividends the longer it is owned, and
warrants granted to shareholders that would become exercisable when their 
shares have been held for a specified duration.526  Changing managerial
compensation is another avenue for consideration.527  Firms are urged to 
utilize deferred compensation arrangements for their top executives to 
counter the pressures for short-termism.528 However, without other steps
being taken, changing managerial compensation will not be very effective 
if boards of directors rely on input from short-term shareholders in deciding
whether to retain them.  There is also the need for long-term metrics 
for evaluating firm performance and their disclosure to investors and
efforts to create long-term firm cultures.529 I refer the reader to my article 
on short-termism and the vast literature on short-termism for additional 
suggestions.530 
Finally, nonfinancial firms will benefit from the regulation of financial
firms. Uncertainties created by market manipulations and excesses of 
financial firms make long-term investments by non-financial firms less likely 
to occur. 531  The financial crisis has shown the dangers of unregulated financial 
products and the potential for systemic risk.  Additionally, our markets 
524. See supra note 348 (discussing short-term shareholder classifications). 
525. Memorandum from Sullivan & Cromwell LLP on Proxy Access: Developments 
in Market Practices 1, 3 (Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/ 
SC_Publication_Proxy_Access__Developments_in_Market_Practice.pdf [https://perma.cc/D48C-
BE5X].
526. See generally Patrick Bolton & Frederic Samama, Loyalty-Shares: Rewarding
Long-Term Investors, 25 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 86, 88, 95 (2013) (discussing the use of
dividends and warrants to encourage long-term time horizons); Dallas & Barry, supra note 
350 (exploring the pros and cons of time-phased voting). 
527. See Dallas, Short-Termism, supra note 291, at 358–61. 
528. See id. at 277, 358, 361. 
529. BARTON ET AL., supra note 489, at 13; Dallas, Short-Termism, supra note 291, 
at 324–28.  Firm cultures have an impact on whether managers will “delay a new project 
and sacrifice some value” to meet quarterly earnings expectations.  BARTON ET AL., supra
note 489, at 8. 
530. See generally Dallas, Short-Termism, supra note 291. 
531. See discussion supra Section IV.A.9. 
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are made more vulnerable with massive gambles in naked derivatives, and 
the control of commodities markets by financial firms.532 
Society in general will benefit from the sustainability conception.  It
will support a focus on the wellbeing of workers, consumers, and other
stakeholders, including long-term shareholders.  Rather than non-financial 
firms serving financial firms, the positions of these firms would become
reversed. The sustainability conception would also require a broader 
understanding of corporate governance that would encompass the operation 
and regulation of financial markets,533 global trade,534 and industrial
concentration as these factors impact firms, workers, consumers, and society 
in general.535 
V. CONCLUSION
What I have learned from looking back over the course of history is 
there is always hope for change when an existing, seemingly immutable 
conception has taken hold. As people observe and experience the negative
implications of a conception, they seek changes.  These changes are influenced 
by the writings of academics, forward-looking business leaders, investors,
and politicians responding to public outrage through regulatory changes. 
In the process, we see the emergence of new conceptions of corporate
governance. These changes influence corporate cultures and the strategies 
pursued by businesses.  To those operating in the business environment,
what currently exists often seems right and inevitable—the only way to do 
business—but that is not the case.  The current conception is the result
of a confluence of a number of different factors that are interpreted by people
trying to make sense of their environment and prosper.  Unfortunately, the 
conception ultimately adopted may have unintended consequences, negatively 
impacting the economy and people’s lives, and call for further evolution.
I observe that the writings of economists, judges, and scholars have had 
a large impact on conceptions of corporate governance over the years.
Therefore, I have reason for optimism as I read progressive corporate law
scholarship.  However, the current situation calls for even greater engagement 
of these scholars in public discourse than in the past in a political environment
of rapid regulatory changes.  I encourage them to distill their ideas into
 532. See discussion supra Section IV.A.9. 
533. See supra Section IV.A.9 and text accompanying note 431. 
534. See supra note 431. 
535. See supra text accompanying notes 280–82.
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formats accessible to public officials and the interested public.  I also believe 
that it is necessary for scholars to broaden their areas of expertise to encompass
an expanded notion of corporate governance and thus effectively contribute
to the resolution of the complex problems facing society.
564
